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dominance from which Soviet influence can be exercised with relative impunity.
Third, the Soviet view of nuclear war differs radically from that of the United
States. Soviet strategic doctrine represents a realistic military approach to
the problem of nuclear war, and consists of a set of war fighting guidelines
which capitalize on the key principles of surprise, early seizure of the stra-
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The strategic relationship which exists between the U.S. and the
J.S.S.R. is an important consideration in charting the course of inter-
national relations in the remainder of this century. To understand the
lature of this relationship, especially as it evolves in the SALT era,
Dne must understand three fundamental realities of Soviet strategic
policy. First, the interests of the Soviet Union, and the means selec-
ted in pursuit of those interests, are conditioned by an experience which
Is unique to Soviet Russia. This experience lacks sufficient commonality
ijith that of the United States to serve as a basis for mutual cooperation
and accommodation. Second, developments in the Soviet nuclear arsenal
are designed to secure a position of strategic dominance from which
Soviet influence can be exercised with relative impunity. Third, the
Soviet view of nuclear war differs radically from that of the United
States. Soviet strategic doctrine represents a realistic military ap-
proach to the problem of nuclear war, and consists of a set of war
fighting guidelines which capitalize on the key principles of surprise,
2arly seizure of the strategic initiative, and decisive use of nuclear
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The nature of the relationship which exists between superpowers is
one important factor which will influence world developments in the
remainder of the Twentieth Century. One of the more discernible facets
of this relationship, which is widely regarded by many as the most signi-
ficant, concerns the strategic military balance which exists between the
United States and the Soviet Union. The increased level of interest
recently afforded this single element of an otherwise multifaceted
relationship can in part be traced to the emergence of an equilibrium in
strategic military capability which precipitated attempts to increase
mutual security by moderating the growth of strategic weapons through
negotiations. In the West this issue has fueled the long standing debate
which polarizes on the question of the strategic capabilities and inten-
tions of the Soviet Union.
Discarding the radical fringe at either end of the debating spectrum,
one is able to identify two opposing philosophical positions. The
liberal faction holds that unilateral restraint coupled with amicable
negotiations offer the most promising means of reducing the threat of a
nuclear confrontation. Secure in the belief that univeral peace and
tranquility are objectives shared by all, they maintain that the mere
opportunity to limit forces supplemented with exemplars of restraint are
the only preconditions necessary to the mutual relaxation of tension.
The conservative faction advocates a return to a position of strategic
superiority over the Soviet Union. Unwilling to trust fate in the hands
of Soviet Russia, they argue that possession of overwhelming dominance

in strategic weapons is the only means of channeling international
behavior along acceptable paths. The various positions taken in the
course of this debate can be located between these idealistic and dicta-
torial extremes.
An analysis of the current deliberations on the strategic intentions
of the Soviet Union, which has intensified in the U.S. debate over SALT,
surfaces three fundamental issues which will be presented in the context
of the ongoing discussions. The first issue is whether there exists a
sufficient commonality of interests and objectives to serve as a basis
for mutual cooperation. Is there a universal plane transcending national
interests which can serve as a forum for the equitable resolution of
common problems or are the differences between the competitive systems
so enduring as to preclude such accommodation. One element of the
national debate holds with the former interpretation, Paul Warnke, one-
time Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, maintains
that sufficient commonality exists to enable mutual concessions in the
interest of survival.
The contrasting position argues that an equitable settlement of "com-
mon problems" is not possible precisely because the interests of each
system are diametrically opposed. These and other spokesmen of this fac-
tion point to the various tenets of Soviet doctrine which define the
course of world history in terms of enduring conflict as evidence of the
2inimicability of superpower interests.
The second fundamental issue revolves around the trends evident in
the development of Soviet strategic forces. Both sides recognize the
increased military might of the Soviet Union. The differences emerge in
understanding its cause, in forecasting its future direction, and in

conceiving of a means of moderating its pace. On the one hand, accele-
ration in Soviet strategic power is explained primarily as a function of
the "action - reaction" pattern commonly associated with arms races.
Soviet force developments are viewed as merely oriented toward redressing
an imbalance.
Now there's no question of the fact that the Soviet Union's
rate of expansion in recent years has been greater than that of
the United States. We were first in building up the number of
strategic weapons that we considered adequate for our security
requirements. They have been forced to catch up or to accept
permanent strategic inferiority.
This pronouncement is invariably followed by an affirmation of the rough
equality of strategic nuclear power which exists between the U.S. and
the U.S.S.R. While specific asymmetries in force composition are con-
ceded, the aggregate balance is believed symmetrical in the sense that each
side is capable of delivering catastrophic devastation on the other.
Negotiated limitation of strategic weapons is held to represent the only
viable approach to the reduction of forces. Alternatives to mutual cur-
tailment "are unacceptable: Appeasement, economic exhaustion resulting
4from an arms race, or a nuclear holocaust."
The popular counter to this position acknowledges the previous exis-
tence of U.S. dominance in strategic capability and frequently recognizes
the necessity of an approximate equivalence in strategic forces as a pre-
requisite to stability or negotiated limitation. It differs, however, in
its reading of the trends displayed in the development of Soviet forces
and in the prolonged existence of parallel capabilities. Citing evidence
of disproportionate growth in strategic forces, continuous rejuvenation
of weapons systems, and major advancements in technology, this faction
concludes that Soviet behavior is inconsistent with a commitment to

"rough equality." Moreover, the presence of a credible U.S. second-
strike capability, the cornerstone of a deterrent strategy, is ques-
tioned in light of the growing counterforce dimension of Soviet strategic
weapons systems. While this element agrees that negotiated limitations
offer prospects for moderating the pace of the "arms race," they argue
that previous accommodations in SALT have placed the U.S. at distinct
disadvantage. The only alternative to appeasement is believed to lie
in the undertaking of prompt initiatives to upgrade strategic capabilities,
and thus, from a position of strength, "persuade the Soviet Union to nego-
tiate and accept a fair, balanced, and verifiable. . .agreement."
A final issue of this debate is somewhat related to the first, in that
it concerns differing perceptions of a common problem, viz, what strategic
doctrine offers the greatest degree of security in a nuclear age? The
Soviet response to this question has been the focus of considerable atten-
tion by the more conservative faction. It is somewhat difficult, in
fact, to locate cogent arguments espoused by the more liberal camp to
assuage the fears expressed by their opponents. The classic rejoinder to
some of the more disconcerting aspects of Soviet nuclear doctrine holds
that such thinking does not reflect serious commitment but is instead
designed to achieve political impact. They contend that avowal of an
aggressive militaristic doctrine supports two essential requirements of
Soviet policy: first, it strengthens the solidarity and morale of the
homefront; and second, it serves to bolster the credibility of Soviet
o
nuclear forces. Another related interpretation, which downplays the
content of Soviet doctrine, maintains that nuclear weapons have created
a condition in which any thought of relative advantage after a strategic
exchange is abstract and unrealistic. Commenting on the Soviet objective
10

of emerging from a nuclear contest better off than the opponent, Mr.
Warnke advises:
It seems to me that instead of talking in those terms, which would
indulge what I regard as the primitive aspects of Soviet nuclear
doctrine, we ought to be trying to educate them into the real
world of strategic nuclear weapons, which is that nobody could
possibly win.
As mentioned, the alternate position puts more credence in what the
Soviets say about nuclear war. Members of this alliance place "stated
intent" on a par with "observed capability" when debating Soviet objec-
tives vis-a-vis strategic issues. Furthermore, they argue that intent
and capability are mutually supportive. If trends displayed in the
development of strategic forces parallel and reflect the stated principles
of doctrinal thought, then the credibility of the latter is believed
significantly enhanced. Richard Pipes, Har<7ard professor and Chairman of
"Team B," cautions:
There is ample evidence that the Soviet military say what they mean,
and usually mean what they say. When the recently deceased Soviet
Minister of Defense, Marshal Grechko, assures us: 'We have never
concealed, and do not now conceal, the fundamental tenets of our
military doctrine,' he deserves a hearing.
These three issues then, underlie the current debate. Despite the
alarmist intensity with which these and other questions are frequently
argued, this debate is not unique or peculiar to today's environment.
It emerged long ago when existing institutions perceived a challenge to
the status quo by a form of government previously alien to the inter-
national scene. It has, however, intensified due to the persistence with
which that challenge has been issued, the strengthened position of the
challenger, and the degree of vulnerability felt by those challenged.
The selection of a response to this challenge is a delicate task. In
doing so, extreme care must be exercised not to err on the side of caution
11

by underestimating reality or by allowing idealistic expectations to hinder
rationality. Simultaneously, discretion must be employed to avoid over-
reaction in the form of a "disproportionate response to a miscalculated
challenge."
The discussion which follows examines the Soviet position on the
three fundamental issues of this debate. It is hoped that this inquiry
will surface and accentuate the salient points, and thus make a contri-
bution to the ongoing debate which is likely to continue and intensify
regardless of the outcome of SALT II, SALT III, or beyond. Chapter two
consists of an analysis of Soviet behavior from the perspective of four
key factors, and thus speaks to the problem of a commonality of interests
and objectives which might serve as a basis for mutual cooperation. Re-
lying on historical, geopolitical, and economic data, it introduces the
reader to the nature of Soviet Russia by identifying some of the influences
which condition Soviet perceptions. Chapter three addresses the strategic
forces of the Soviet Union. Drawing on a wide variety of open source
material, this section is designed to provide the layman with a basic
understanding of Soviet strategic capabilities. It inspects the compo-
sition of the strategic arsenal, examines the trends displayed in its
evolutionary development, and discusses the type of posture such an
arsenal is likely to support. A brief comparison of Soviet and American
forces is provided to place this assessment in perspective. Chapter
four analyzes the Soviet view of nuclear warfare as discussed by that
element of Soviet society charged with the responsibility of coping with
it. This chapter consists of a content analysis of original Soviet state-
ments prepared for distribution within the Soviet military elite. The
primary source is Voyennaya mysl ' (Military Thought), the monthly journal
12

of the Soviet Ministry of Defense and General Staff, portions of which
have recently been declassified by the Central Intelligence Agency.
Protected by Soviet security classification, the journal was circulated
in restricted channels. This feature makes it an invaluable source of
original and sensitive information on Soviet doctrine.
The potential shortcomings of this study are worthy of comment.
First, it is concemed with only one side of a bilateral strategic rela-
tionship, and thus avoids the broader task of assessing the key issues
from the perspective of the countervailing position. Moreover, addressing
this subject in the context of a bilateral connection tends to overshadow
the growing multilateral dimension of the international scene. The emer-
gence of new powers and alliances, coupled with the inevitable prolifera-
tion of strategic nuclear weapons, will undoubtably condition the future
strategic thinking and behavior of the two superpowers. Second, this
analysis concentrates on the strategic (nuclear) military situation to
the exclusion of conventional or general purpose forces. The looming
presence of large arsenals of weapons of mass destruction frequently
eclipses the significance of more orthodox forms of military power.
These, however, are nonetheless important in calculating overall military
capabilities and intentions. A look at the growth, sophistication, and
increased mobility of Soviet general purpose forces should highlight cer-
tain parallels with regard to the strategic forces.
Finally, this is not an analysis of the SALT experience. Although the
reader will find reference to the effects of SALT on Soviet behavior, this
study does not pretend to evaluate previous or pending agreements. It
does, however, address the fundamental issues which underpin the debate
on SALT. Too frequently this debate degenerates into chaotic bargaining
13

over extraneous details. Some argue that the Soviet lead in throw weight
and yield is menacing and must be reversed. Others maintain that the
aggregate number of U.S. warheads outnumbers the Soviets by a margin of
two to one. To be sure, the details are important, but all too often
they tend to obfuscate the substantive issues. Any accommodation which
restrains numbers alone is at best a transitory solution. Such an
approach ministers to the symptoms of an ailment without addressing the




II. DETERMINANTS OF SOVIET STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR
This chapter provides an assessment of selected determinants of the
Russian/ Soviet operational milieu to provide a foundation from which one
can approach the comprehension of Soviet strategic thought. This is
not to say that those factors selected represent the only variables which
condition Soviet behavior. Indeed, numerous social scientists have
devoted volumes to the delineation of relevant variables. The following,
however, appear central to the nature of Soviet doctrine.
A. GEOGRAPHIC REALITY
The size, shape and latitude of a state are key determinants for
two essential reasons. First, these factors affect the basic capabilities
of a state in terms of resources, population, climate, production, trade,
etc. Second, they form the "environment" which conditions the psycho-
logical outlook of its inhabitants.
The Soviet Union occupies one-sixth of the world's land surface.
Measuring in excess of 8,600,000 square miles, it extends 6000 miles from
East to West, 3,000 miles from North to South, and is thus, more than
twice as large as any other country. This "geographic generosity" offers
numerous benefits, but also incurs certain strategic limitations. While
12
this vastness endows plentiful natural resources, it also presents ob-
stacles to effective multifaceted communication and exploitation of those
resources. The Soviet Union is less fortunate in terms of shape. Year-
round access to deep water ports is limited to Murmansk in the West and
Vladivostok in the East. In geopolitical terms, shape provides common
borders with 12 nations.
15

The latitudinal location of the Soviet Union represents another
obstacle to its ability to exploit its resources. The majority of its
territory lies north of the 45" parallel. Such severe climatic condi-
tions result in a short agricultural season. This problem is made more
complex by a lack of adequate rainfall in areas where the soil is of
13
high quality. It is also significant to note the impact of this type
of climate on its inhabitants. To contend with such severe conditions
requires a certain concerted dedication not necessary in more temperate
latitudes.
Topographically, the Soviet Union consists essentially of a massive
plain broken by the Ural mountain chain in the central region. Of note
14
is the fact that there are no significant natural barriers in the West.
Historically, this geographic feature has been cited as a factor which
invited two major invasions of Russia, i.e.. Napoleon in 1812 and Hitler
in 1941. Additionally, it has been referenced as justification for the
post war creation of a series of "buffer states" subordinate to Soviet
domination. Richard Pipes provides an interesting counter to this
"perceived need" by maintaining that due to the topographical nature of
the Western plain, e.g., depth of defenses, low population density,
transport difficulty, etc. , Russia is itself the most difficult country
to conquer, and therefore, requires no buffers.
On balance, geography has endowed Russia with immense intrinsic
wealth but has seriously complicated the development of that potential
through the imposition of formidable restrictions, e.g., climate, shape,
size, etc. The lack of a technological ability to exploit existent
resources, coupled with a poor agricultural foundation has necessitated
a drive for territorial expansion. Vernon Asputurian has noted that
16

Russia's central geographic location provided immense opportunities for
territorial expansion. Between mid-sixteenth century and the end of
the seventeenth, Russia is calculated to have conquered territory the
size of the Netherlands each year for 150 years. During the period
18
1939-1946, the Soviet Union annexed an additional 250,000 square miles
and became the only great power to emerge from the second World War larger
than before. Historically, Russia has demonstrated a persistent tradi-
tion of quest for geographic expansion in every conceivable direction:
Westward, Southward in the Balkans, and toward the East at the expense
of China.
While the significance of geography has been moderated to an extent
with technological advancements in transportation, communications,
weaponry, etc., its historical and contemporary impact on Russia's
Weltanschauung lingers. Its foreboding climate and relative agricultural
infertility operate to condition what one might describe as a cynical view
of a "man versus nature" struggle, bordering on the nihilistic. At the
same time, its massive size conditions a contrasting influence - one of
systemic centrality. All else is inferior and thus subordinate to
Mother Russia.
B. HISTORICAL TRADITION AND NATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS
In 1845, Karl Marx penned the phrase "History is nothing but the
activity of man in pursuit of his ends." The history of a particular
country exerts an influence on the perceptions and behavior of its con-
temporary inhabitants. With this in mind, it is of interest to examine
certain aspects of the Russian historical tradition in an attempt to
identify characteristics and developmental patterns which may function
as an influence on current behavior.
17

Russian history is said to have begun with the formation of the
principality of Kiev (Kievsky Rus) by Norsemen under the leadership of
19
Rurik in 850. This political entity lasted almost four centuries until
conquered by a Mongol-Tatar force under the leadership of Batu Khan
(grandson of Genghis Khan) in 1240. Survivors of this conquest gravi-
tated to Moscow where the populace had learned that survival could best
be maintained if the "Golden Horde" was treated with accommodation in
lieu of resistance. This situation continued until 1480 when Ivan III,
Grand Duke of Moscow, refused to pay tribute to the Mongols. Subsequently,
the control of the Golden Horde began to decline and Moscow emerged as
• 20
the center of Russia.
Moscow's existence was then challenged by the Poles. To contend with
this threat, the Moscow Princes granted fiefs to military officers who
thus served as regional commanders and land managers. With the death of
Ivan IV (The Terrible) in 1584, a new era known as the "time of trouble"
began which involved a variety of class warfare. The Poles then estab-
lished themselves in power until 1613, when a religious coalition ousted
21
them and appointed a member of the Romanov family as Tzar. This monar-
chial family was to continue in power for a period to exceed three hun-
dred years.
Nobles began to demand the return of their serfs who had dispersed
during the time of trouble. In response, the Tzar ordered a manhunt
which resulted in the return of most of the workers. In 1649, a "register"
22
was established which listed all serfs. The institution of serfdom was
to continue until 1861.
This brief foray into medieval Russian history is presented to illus-
trate the emergence, amid conflict, of an imperial/authoritarian tradition.
18
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One noted historian has observed that subsequent to the founding of the
"Moscow Monarchy" the Russian state has exercised a "proprietary/patri-
monial" control over its territory and its populace. In essence, the
23
government perceives its ownership of the country. The concept of the
state, and its elite, as the ultimate authority is a tradition clearly
evident in Russian history and current Soviet policy. An interesting
and illustrative story is told of the tenth century ruler of Kiev,
Prince Vladimir Svystoslav, who, in searching for an instrximent of power
and discipline to organize and rule his subjects, sought a religious
belief to fill the needed void. He selected the East Orthodox religion
of Byzantium, organized a priesthood, and on a Sunday morning in 988
mobilized the entire population of Kiev and marched them into the river
Dnieper — from which they emerged baptized Christians. Such was the
introduction of the concept of the church as an instrument of state
24
power. Russia has heavily inherited the Byzantine tradition of the
25
state representing the highest principle of society.
A key feature of the Russian tradition which distinguishes it from
contemporary Western society is the evolution of state authority. While
authoritarian rule has declined in Western society over time, the con-
trary has occurred in Russia from the 15th century onward. Even now,
Soviet Russia lacks any tradition of civil liberty or of rule by law
26
which governs the ruled as well as the rulers.
The history of Russia is a monument to conflict, invasion, and war.
Many historians have observed that Russia served as a buffer to protect
Western Europe from invasion, and thereby fostered the progressive
development of European civilization at the expense of Russia's. During
the period of 1228 to 1462, Russia experienced 160 foreign invasions while
19

Western Europe was engaged in the Renaissance. During the period of
Enlightenment of the 17th and 18th centuries it was involved in ten wars
with Sweden and Poland. The 19th century witnessed the Napoleonic Wars
(during which Moscow was burned), the Crimean War, and the Russo-Turkish
wars. The 20th century brought war with Japan, the first World War, and,
27
most notably, the second World War. The casualty statistics of Russia
in the 20th century alone are staggering. Since 1914, some 60 million
persons are calculated to have been lost to war, (international and
civil) famine, and purges. One- third of these occurred as a result of
World War II. A comparison may illustrate the magnitude of these
losses. Subsequent to 1775, the United States has lost 650,000 to war.
This figure is fewer than that experienced by the Soviet Union in the
28
900 day siege of Leningrad alone.
The magnitude of this conflict experience has given rise to a pro-
nounced military influence within Russian history and tradition. This
has lead to an obsession with military power. If one objectively surveys
Russian history, with particular attention to events in the 20th century,
one is confronted with the observation that the exercise of military
power has been a major factor in its development. It has served to install
a communist form of government, (Bolshevik success in the Civil War),
defeat a determined and capable enemy (Germany) , expand international
influence (hegemony in Eastern Europe) , and enabled a rise to a position
of equality and recognition among superpowers (nuclear parity) . One
historian has noted that while other tactics have failed to produce
desired results, e.g., ideology has lost its influence, the Soviet eco-
nomic model has failed, etc., the tactic of exerting military power has
29
consistently met with success.
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The influence of this military tradition operates in two discernible
fashions. First, as has been noted, it serves to promote external objec-
tives. Second, it functions as an internal element of control to insure
maintenance of the Soviet system. In an environment devoid of conflict
and tension, the Soviet system would experience difficulty. Maintaining
the military in a position of preeminence serves to perpetuate the atmo-
sphere necessary for Soviet continuity. Each of these influences serve
to exaggerate the perceived need for military power, and consequently,
the levels of military capability will tend to exceed that which is
necessary for defense purposes. Solzhenitsyn illustrated this observation
in his Letter to the Soviet Leaders ;
Military obligations dictate, you say? But in fact we have only
one-tenth of the military obligations we pretend to have, or rather
that we intensively and assiduously create for ourselves. . .For
peacetime we armed to excess several times over. . .we maintain this
army solely out of military and diplomatic vanity.
In any historical analysis, one must ask oneself if any trends rela-
tive to perceived objectives emerge from a country's historical experience.
In the case of the United States one might identify a certain misguided
altruistic desire to foster a world order based on peace and free self-
31determination. In the case of Great Britain, one might observe a ten-
dency toward maintenance of a certain status quo which facilitated an
increase in self-prosperity. The Russian response to this perceived objec-
tive has been labeled by many as domination of the world. One must exer-
cise great caution in accepting any of these generalizations on face
value and in viewing a country's behavior solely in terms of means/ends
calculations. It is, however, of interest to examine the historical
evidence cited as the basis for reaching such conclusions.
21

The Marquis de Custine, a French observer of Russia in the manner de
Tocqueville was of the United States, discerned a driving Russian motive
in 1839. "An immense ambition ferments in the hearts of the Russian
32
people. That nation, essentially aggressive. . .dreams of world domination."
Friedrich Engels, a coauthor of the ideology on which Soviet communism is
founded, made similar observations. Russia's
ceaseless intervention in Western affairs was to secure it the mastery
of Europe. There was no land grab, no outrage, no repression on the
part of Czarism which was not carried out under the pretext of enlighten-
ment, of liberalism, of the liberation of nations. (Russia's goal is)
the attainment of its own single, never changing, never-lost-sight-of
objective: the domination of the world..." ^
Michael Pogodin, a Russian playwright, poetically expressed:
My heart trembles with joy, Russia, my Fatherland. . .you, you
are chosen to consumate, to crown the development of humanity,
to embody all the various human achievements. .. in one great syn-
thesis, to reconcile heart with reason, to establish true justice
and peace.
The ultimate validity of these dated observations is indeed ques-
tionable. However, when one examines the basic tenets of Soviet ideology
a certain continuity of purpose appears to exist. Proclamation of such
a destiny may serve a multitude of purposes. Discarding the possibility
that it represents a latent aspiration, one must recognize that it func-
tions in a motivational sense to engender a sense of purpose and to bol-
ster the will to contend with an environment frequently harsh and fore-
boding.
Before leaving the Russian historical tradition, it may be helpful to
summarize certain "national characteristics" which emerge from the Russian
experience. One author has noted that the "Russian mind" is fascinating
due to the "lure of the quaint, the bizarre, the incongruous." ^ This
characteristic is frequently encountered in Russian literature - Tolstoy
wrote of a policeman thrown into a river tied to a bear; Gogal told of a
22

civil servant who looked in his mirror one morning to discover that his
nose had disappeared during the night. In Russian legend, a 16th century
Tzar is reputed to have ordered the slaughter of a gift elephant for
failure to bow to him. These qualities are also apparent in recorded
history - Emperor Nicholas I determined the route of Russia's first major
railway between St. Petersburg and Moscow by using a ruler to draw a line
between the two cities on a map. The engineers faithfully followed this
line, to include detours accidentally caused at points where the
Emperor's fingers had protruded.
Violence, cruelty, and sudden unpredictability are other characteris-
tics which appear to find expression in the Russian experience. Peter
the Great condemned a nobleman to be beheaded for embezzlement. The
prisoner was led to the chopping block, placed his head upon it, and
heard the ax whistle through the air - only to strike the block, not the
suddenly pardoned victim. Stalin is reported to have laughed hysterically
as one of his police officials described the few minutes preceding the
execution of Zinovyev, wherein Zinovyev violated his atheistic Marxism
by calling on Jehovah for salvation. Stalin later ordered that the teller
of the story also be executed. Both men were Jewish. Soviet POW's re-
leased from Finland after the winter war of 1939-1940 were paraded through
the streets of Leningrad which had been decorated with banners stating:
"The Fatherland Greets its Heroes." The POW's marched straight through
the city to the railroad station where they were loaded onto cattle cars
for transport to concentration camps. Their crime had been failure to
37
avoid capture.
Another feature of the Russian tradition is an obsession with pres-
tige as a means of concealing a basic inferiority. Massive efforts have
23

been undertaken to impress the observer with the greatness of Russia. The
classic example is Peter the Great's 1703 declaration that St. Petersburg
be built as a model city in the middle of an uninhabited swamp. A most
absurdly amusing incident occurred with the issue of a 12 sided phonograph
recording of one of Stalin's speeches. The entire last side was devoted
to the joyful clapping of the audience. The inauguration of the space
era with the October 1957 launching of Sputnik is another monument to
38
Russian prestige. Likewise, Khrushchev's boasts of Soviet nuclear
capability were designed to impress the world. This preoccupation with
prestige appears to be motivated by two factors, each stemming from inse-
curity. First, it reflects the Soviet perception of a need to illustrate
the fact that Soviet Russia is a great and powerful nation. Second, it
serves as a tool to compensate the populace for certain basic deficiencies
which exist as a result of geopolitical reality.
A final quality which emerges from the Russian experience is xeno-
phobia. This is bred of geographic isolation, invasion, and an innate
suspicion and distrust of anything non-slavic.
Russia's historical tradition has endowed the contemporary Soviet
state with an authoritarian, militaristic, and self-reliant view of
itself and the world in which it is forced to operate. One of the most
impressive features of Russian history, especially that of Soviet Russia,
is a tremendously high degree of dedication and resolve.
C. POLITICAL PROCESS
The political system existing within a given country is a key indi-
cator of the type of behavior it is likely to display. In analyzing
this aspect of a system, one must recognize the parameters within which
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political processes operate. One element deals with input stimuli deri-
ving from the external environment. Another concerns inputs originated
at the internal domestic level. The political process itself involves
the reception of these stimuli, calculation of possible alternative
responses, formulation of policy, and implementation in the form of
output. The bureaucratic process involved in policy selection is con-
ditioned by numerous influences, to include personal ideosyncracies of
the decision makers, bureaucratic interests of responsible officials,
organizational role of various common- interest groups, and perceived
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objectives. An additional factor which comes into play in policy
selection involves the calculation of a cost/benefit analysis of
various alternatives, based on the likely responses of both internal
and external actors to a given policy. The perceptions of members of a
political system exert a major influence on policy behavior. These
perceptions are conditioned by a "world view" which, as indicated above,
is determined by various factors including historical experience, geo-
graphic reality, political tradition, etc. The primary objective of
any political system, to which all others are subordinate, is the con-
tinued maintenance of that system in a position of control. A corollary
objective is the preservation of the national security.
With this introductory discourse on the nature of politics, it should
be of interest to examine a few characteristics of the Soviet system
which may distinguish it from others. As has been previously noted, one
striking feature of the political system is its authoritarian cast. This
type of control is maintained in the hands of the Politburo, a political
elite exercising power in the name of the Communist Party. This elite
40has a vested interest in maintaining its power position. Though changes
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in the composition of this elite frequently occur in an unpredictable
manner, these changes are largely the result of internal initiative,
i.e., not in response to external pressures.
Michael Tatu notes that an important factor underlying the Soviet
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decision making process within the ruling elite is its monolithism.
While one can readily recognize a Soviet elitest desire to project its
image as that of being a unitary body devoid of disagreement in pursuit
of "scientifically objective" goals for the benefit of the state and
mankind; beneath this facade exists a degree of bureaucratic "tugging
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and hauling" common to any collective political system. The distin-
guishing feature of the Soviet system in this regard, however, is that
once a political policy has been adopted within the bureaucratic arena,
a curious unity termed "democratic centralism" exerts its influence to
implement that policy with an apparent monolithic effect.
Another significant aspect of the Soviet political process is its
ability to display a concentration of means. Vesting all elements of
control within an elite party grouping allows for a degree of coordination
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of policy and power unattainable in a more decentralized political system.
This concentration and coordination of means predisposes the Soviet poli-
tical model to cope most effectively with situations developed on the basis
of its own initiative, and less efficiently on those resulting from the
44initiative of others. In other words, this political system is more
effective in an offensive mode than when required to react defensively.
An interesting feature of Soviet politics in the realm of foreign
policy is its apparent teleological nature. This derives in part from
45Soviet ideology and Russian history. The political means of calculating
the position of the Soviet Union vis-a-vis movement toward its perceived
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objectives is accomplished in an assessment of the "correlation of world
forces." There are four major aspects of this correlation. The first
involves economic forces and concerns a variety of quantitative calcu-
lations of productivity, GNP, growth patterns, level of technological
development, etc. The second relates to military capability in terms
of quantity and quality of weapons systems and the viability of doctrinal
thought. The third factor addresses the political vitality of the state,
its level of popular support, and its ability to respond to situations




The Soviet political elite has discerned three key shifts in the corre-
lation of forces. The first occurred with the emergence of a communist
state in 1917. The second was marked by the defeat of Germany in 1945.
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The most recent shift began in 1969 with attainment of strategic parity.
Additionally, the Soviets maintain that the correlation is continuing to
shift in their favor. They are firm in the conviction that this movement
in the correlation of forces brought detente, not a cooperative spirit on
the part of the U.S. This belief is significant because in one respect,
it illustrates the Soviet perception of the political utility of military
power in a nuclear age. The shifting correlation of forces is understood
to have compelled the U.S. to adopt a more accommodating posture toward
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the U.S.S.R. This view of international politics lends a certain con-
tinuity of purpose to the Soviet political system and serves to legitimize
its foreign policy both at home and abroad.
Another advantage to the centralized political system of the Soviet
Union is its allowance for a high degree of flexibility in policy formu-
lation. Numerous scholars have identified opportunism as a recurring
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feature of Soviet foreign policy. The flexibility inherent in a centra-
lized decision making apparatus endows an ability to exploit various
opportunities, as they arise, in pursuit of desired national objectives.
Clearly the Soviet Union has demonstrated a continuing increase in the
level of sophistication utilized in its political view of the international
arena. The existence of the Institute of World Economy and International
Relations and the Institute of the USA and Canada, quasi "think tanks,"
somewhat akin to the RAND corporation or the Brookings Institute, illus-
trates the development of an enlightened analytical approach to the
understanding of world politics, and specifically the competitive rela-
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tionship existing between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.
In summary, the Soviet political system can be defined as a centra-
lized authoritarian bureaucracy which appears to be highly responsive
in foreign policy matters, perhaps at the expense of its ability to
fully satisfy domestic needs. Political priorities involve the perpe-
tuation of the ruling elite, maintenance of the Soviet state, and expan-
sion of its global influence. '
D. ECONOMIC POLICIES
Economic factors reveal several insights into Soviet policy. First,
the nature of an economic system indicates the priorities which have been
established in terms of allocation of resources. Second, prosperity and
growth are important measures of the capability which can be applied in
pursuit of a state's national interest.
Central direction and control are the most striking features of the
Soviet economic model. This allows for the establishment of economic
priorities by the ruling elite which are to be implemented through command
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channels. Detailed economic planning is one manifestation of this cen-
trality. This is accomplished through five year plans which attempt to
forecast the growth pattern for each sector of the economy.
Another significant aspect of the Soviet Union is the subordination
of light industry and consumer needs to heavy industry and defense. This
is made possible by the centrality inherent in the economic system.
William Odom has observed that "it is not a question, in the Soviet view,
of guns and butter - what mix for social satisfaction? It is a question
of how much butter must be produced in order to obatin the highest rate
of military growth."
The gross national product (GNP) of the Soviet Union is approximately
one-half that of the U.S., yet the percentage of GNP allocated to heavy
industry and defense spending reflects a disproportionate amount vis-a-
vis U.S. allocation. During the period 1970-1975, the U.S.S.R. ave-
raged 24.5% of its GNP for fixed capital investment. By comparison, the
U.S. allocated 14%. In 1974, the per capita consumption of consumer
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services in the Soviet Union was only 35% of that of the U.S.
The CIA estimated in June 1978 that during the period 1967-1977
Soviet defense spending accounted for 11% to 13% of their GNP. The U.S.
allocation in 1977 represented 5.1% of GNP. The Soviet Union is pro-
jected to increase its defense spending in the early 1980' s at a growth
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rate of 4% to 5% per year. The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
has calculated that Soviet military expenditures have risen from $79.2
billion in 1967 to $121 billion in 1976, while U.S. expenditures have
declined from $120 billion to $86.7 billion during the same period.
Certain hidden features within the economic systems of the two countries
serve to widen the margin of defense spending. For example, while 56%
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of the U.S. defense budget goes toward pay and allowances, only 16% of
Soviet spending is consumed in a like manner.
The military/industrial orientation of the Soviet economy is made at
some sacrifice, most notably in terms of economic growth. During the
period of the ninth economic plan (1971-1975) growth slowed markedly
in most sectors due in part to a decline in the labor force and poor
agricultural production. During this same period, however, growth in
heavy industry continued to display a high rate of expansion. This
decline presents serious economic problems for the Soviet Union. While
most nations pursue economic growth for domestic prosperity and to
support foreign policy programs, the U.S.S.R. is subject to an additional
motive - a historic drive to "overtake and surpass" the West.
There appear to be two major options which could provide for increased
growth. The first is serious economic reform with adoption of some type
of market system. l"/hile sufficient historical precedent exists for a
reform of this nature (the New Economic Policy of the 1920 's), the pros-
pect of its adoption does not seem likely. Such reform, including an
increase in managerial independence, consumer control, etc. , would jeo-
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pardize the position of the Soviet government. Additionally, it would
have a negative influence on continued growth of the defense effort.
The second alternative to provide growth without fundamental reform and
alteration of existent economic priorities, is to import Western tech-
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nology to raise labor productivity. There appears to be sufficient evi-
dence to suggest that the Soviet Union has opted for the latter alternative,
In summary, the economy of the Soviet Union, like its political struc-
ture, is dominated by centralized direction and control. This permits
allocation of economic resources to areas perceived by the leadership to
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warrant priority. It is clear that heavy industry, with its military
implications, has received the focus of Soviet economic efforts. This
penchant for placing military above social needs may be viewed as a baro-
meter of domestic and foreign policy. A reversal in these priorities
would signal a fundamental change in Soviet policy orientation - a change
much more reliable than that heralded with detente rhetoric.
This examination of four elements of the Soviet experience has been
conducted in an attempt to ascertain the type of influence they may exert
on Soviet behavior. The degree of impact of each of these cannot be
measured, but the realization that they do in fact condition behavior
cannot be dismissed.
Geographically, the experience has been harsh and severe. Historically,
the tradition has been violent and at times primitive. The political
process can be characterized as authoritarian. The economic system
reflects a low priority for basic human prosperity. Yet despite what
appears to be a rather foreboding picture painted in these terms, Soviet
Russia has displayed a truly impressive determination in its rise to
superpower stature.
The central question which exists today is to what degree this posi-
tion of power will influence future Soviet behavior. Numerous observers
have hypothesized two alternatives. On the one hand, increased power
and prestige may yield a more assertive and arrogant foreign policy. On
the other, acquisition of this new stature may result in reduced aggres-
siveness.
The first of these alternatives tends to project future Soviet
behavior as being based on the continued operation of the variables dis-
cussed herein, in an environment in which the U.S.S.R. has acquired a
31

new and powerful legitimacy. It thus, ascribes a quasi-permanence to
the influence of the Soviet experience. The second alternative downplays
the significance of this experience, and tends to support an evolutionary
interpretation of behavior. That is to say that behavior is more influen-
ced by existing conditions than by experience. These two alternatives are
key issues which can be viewed in another, albeit philosophical, context.
Both relate to one's interpretation of the essential nature of man and
the state. The first presupposes a certain deterministic influence in
that the state is endowed with characteristics which unavoidably con-
dition its behavior. The second and more sanguine view holds that a
political entity can escape the influence of certain characteristics of
its experience and develop along lines which transcend parochial inte-
rests toward a more Utopian society. While the appeal of the latter
alternative has lured many of an idealistic persuasion, the realities
of history tend to refute the possibility. The Russian experience will
continue to exert a significant influence on Soviet behavior.
The policy implications of this observation appear clear. First,
understand the nature of Soviet Russia - its internal determinants and
capabilities. Second, be alert to the expression of Soviet behavior
within the context of the influences which condition it. Third, react
to threatening foreign policy initiatives from a position of power and
unemotional determination. And finally, maintain a consistency of res-
ponse to further enhance the credibility of resolution.
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III. . STRATEGIC FORCES OF THE SOVIET UNION
One means of assessing the nature and credibility of espoused stra-
tegic policy is to examine the means available with which it might be
implemented. For example, if one were to proclaim a doctrine of pacifism
yet amass a significant arsenal of weapons, the credibility of the
espoused pacifism would be seriously questioned. Conversely, if one
announced a determination to meet the ultimate crisis situation with
overwhelming military might while lacking the necessary military capa-
bility, one's credibility would be equally doubtful.
An analysis of Soviet strategic nuclear forces should yield two
significant insights. The first relates to the ability of the strategic
systems of the Soviet Union to provide a viable means of supporting national
security objectives. The second, and perhaps more important insight,
concerns the identification of certain latent features within the stra-
tegic forces, and trends in their evolutionary development, which tend
to highlight a proclivity for a given strategic posture.
This analysis of Soviet strategic forces will consist of a brief
examination of the calculus of nuclear power, an assessment of the various
offensive and defensive strategic systems available to the Soviet Union
and a look at the trends which have emerged in the development of Soviet
nuclear forces. A brief comparison of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. strategic
arsenals will be conducted to place this analysis in perspective.
A. CALCULUS OF NUCLEAR POWER
There are three basic military effects of a nuclear explosion:
blast, thermal radiation, and nuclear radiation. The intensity of each
33

of these is determined by the yield of the weapon, i.e., power measured as
the equivalent of thousands of tons (kilotons or KT) or millions of tons
(megatons or MT) of TNT, and by the method of employment, i.e., air burst,
surface burst, or subsurface burst. The utility of each of these effects
is largely dependent upon the type of target. In the field of nuclear
strategy two general categories of targets have been established. The
first, countervalue targets, identifies relatively "soft" targets on which
the opponent places a high value. They include population centers, indus-
trial areas, etc. The second, counterforce targets, concern primarily
military targets of varying degrees of "hardness", to include command and
en
control facilities, ICBM silos, airfields, etc. Of the basic effects,
blast is considered most important when attacking a hardened target. Under
appropriate circumstances, any or all of these effects can be important
when dealing with softer targets.
In addition to yield and method of employment, accuracy plays a
decisive role in the level of damage attained. Accuracy is measured in
terms of Circular Error Probable (CEP) , which defines the radius of a
circle centered on a target within which the weapon has a 50% chance of
impacting. For example, a missile warhead with a CEP of .5 nautical
miles would have a 50% chance of landing within a one nautical mile dia-
meter circle centered on the target. As accuracy increases, the CEP
decreases.
The destructive power of a nuclear weapon may be calculated by two
different methods, dependent upon the nature of the target. The first,
termed Equivalent Megatonnage (EMT) concerns damage against soft targets
and is a function of the size of yield alone. The second measure of




target calculations and is a function of both yield and accuracy. A
comparison between these two measures indicates the criticality of accuracy
as a multiplier of lethality when dealing with hard targets. Lethality
is directly proportional to yield and inversely proportional to CEP. An
eight-fold increase in yield will result in four times more useable des-
tructive power. If, however, accuracy is improved by reducing the CEP
by a factor of eight, lethality would increase 64 times. If both yield
and accuracy were improved by factors of eight, the resultant hard target
destructive power would be 256 times greater.
Throw weight represents another measurement of strategic force capa-
bility. This is defined as the weight of the re-entry vehicle (warhead
component) which a given missile is capable of projecting. Throw weight
determines the size, in terms of yield, and the composition, in terms of
numbers, of re-entry vehicles and their associated warheads. For example,
the Soviet SS-18 ICBM is estimated to have a throw weight of 16,000 to
20,000 pounds. This endows it with the capability of projecting one large
warhead in the range of 18 to 25 MT, or numerous smaller separate warheads,
each with lower yields.
Three specific categories of warheads have been developed for missiles.
The first is the single re-entry vehicle or single warhead. The second
category consists of multiple re-entry vehicles (MRV's) which are several
independent warheads with a limited separation capability. This type of
weapon is somewhat analogous to a shotgun shell in that the separate war-
heads are released in a pattern with no independent guidance. The final,
and most sophisticated, type of warhead is the Multiple Independently
Targetable Re-entry vehicle (MIRV) which consists of several warheads
packaged to travel to the vicinity of the target area. These are released
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separately at various stages of the missile's incoming trajectory, and
independently guided to assigned targets.
The potential for a systems failure in a nuclear weapon exists, as it
does in any technological process. Thus, reliability ratings have been
assigned various weapons systems. These ratings are the product of the
reliability of the various sub-systems and phases of employment. For
example an ICBM with a .95 probability of successful launch, a .95
probability of booster separation, a .95 probability of successful re-
entry, and a .95 probability of detonation on target would be assigned an
4 67
overall reliability of .95 or .815. An additional complicating factor
in calculating the reliability and effectiveness of a nuclear attack is
the problem of "fratricide." This phenomenon concerns the detrimental
effects of the detonation of one nuclear device on additional subsequent
weapons entering the same general vicinity. For example, if a specific
target was calculated to require two or more warheads to achieve the
desired level of damage, the effects of the detonation of the first
weapon, in terms of rising debris and electromagnetic disturbance, could
cause subsequent weapons to miss the target, to explode at a non-optimal
height, or not to explode at all.
Thus, when evaluating the capabilities of various strategic nuclear
weapons systems one must go beyond a mere arithmetic calculation of the
number of weapons which compose a strategic arsenal. Of significance are
the type of systems, their size, yield, accuracy, reliability, and the
nature of the target against which they are employed.
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B. THE STRATEGIC ARSENAL
Strategic nuclear forces are defined as those having the capability of
delivering nuclear weapons on targets of either a countervalue or counter-
force nature. Additionally, they include forces and systems designed to
defend against such attacks. In the age of superpowers the term "strategic
nuclear" connotes those systems capable of employment in an intercontinen-
tal exchange against an opponent's homeland. They consists of Intercon-
tinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM), Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles
(SLBM) , long-range bombers, and defensive systems capable of countering
these weapons.
1. Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
Missiles launched from land which depart the earth's atmosphere
prior to re-entry and have a range in excess of 4000 miles are classified
as ICBM's. Like any system, they have certain positive and negative
features. Due to the fact that they are fired from fixed, precisely sur-
veyed positions, they are able to achieve a relatively high degree of
accuracy (dependent upon guidance technology) when compared to other
weapons systems. They also offer the advantage of launching larger yield
weapons and/or multiple warheads. On the negative side of the ledger,
ICBM's are the most vulnerable of strategic offensive systems. Without
sufficient defenses, the primary means of protection is that which is
obtained by burying them in hardened silos beneath the earth's surface.
New Soviet ICBM's are being deployed in hardened silos capable of with-
standing 2000 psi. There are, however, finite limits on the structural
hardness which can be achieved. The maximum strength of reinforced con-
crete is calculated to be 3000 psi, and even silos constructed to this
level of hardness can be defeated by increases in missile accuracy.
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The Soviets have adopted a launch technique for two of their fourth
generation ICBM' s which endows two significant advantages. This procedure,
known as "cold launch", involves propelling the missile out of the silo
with gas generators prior to ignition of the booster motors. As a result,
the silos are not damaged by ignition of the missile's propellant system,
and can thus be reloaded and reused. Additionally, this technique enables
the launching of a heavier missile, with greater throw weight, from a given
•1 71
silo.
The Soviet Union has placed a heavy reliance on its ICBM force as
the mainstay of its strategic nuclear arsenal. It has also placed a higher
premium on larger strategic missiles in terms of throw weight and yield.
This contrasts with the U.S. approach which involved increasing accuracy
72
at the expense of raw power. Initially, the Soviet penchant for massive
size and power in the design of their ICBM's may have been motivated out
of technological necessity. Lacking the sophisticated guidance systems
essential for accurate warhead targeting, they compensated with the less
precise delivery of increased yield. A crude analogy follows: If one is
unable to demonstrate the accuracy necessary to kill the target with a
rifle, use of a cannon should compensate. Although less accurate, the
increase in destructive power would produce the desired effect.
This tendency toward massive power continues to pay benefits. Now
that the Soviet Union has accomplished improvements in both guidance accu-
racy and MIRV technology, it is able to incorporate these developments
into existing larger missile systems which have been legitimized through
73the strategic balance negotiated in SALT I and SALT II.
The size of yield of the Soviet strategic weapons systems is




Soviet warheads have a yield in the range of five to 25 megatons. The
magnitude of this power may be placed into proper perspective when one
recalls that a 20 kiloton weapon was detonated on Hiroshima. Figure one
illustrates the composition of the Soviet ICBM arsenal.
The SS-9 ICBM carries the NATO code name "SCARP" and was first
deployed in 1965. Four modifications of the missile have been identified.
The SS-9 Mods One and Two consist of three-stage liquid propellant weapons
capable of delivering warheads in the range of 18 to 25 megatons. Origi-
nally 320 SS-9 silos were constructed, but beginning in 1973 a portion of
these were converted to accommodate the later generation SS-18. An
additional improvement in the SS-9/SS-18 silo system involves increased
structural hardness. The Mod Three version of the SS-9 is believed to
be capable of employment in a depressed trajectory mode or as a Fractional
Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS) . Both these techniques serve to reduce
the missile's vulnerability to early detection and anti-ballistic missile
defense. The depressed trajectory feature involves utilization of a
flatter trajectory to keep the missile below the horizon at which it can be
acquired by radar. The FOBS mode of employment consists of placing the
weapon in some form of fractional orbit and then, on command, causing the
warhead to execute a re-entry. Although this feature reduces accuracy,
it also reduces the warning time available to determine the location of
the intended target. While the Mod Three has not been tested since 1971,
and U.S. intelligence does not believe it is currently deployed, there is
little conclusive evidence to indicate that these techniques have been com-
pletely discarded. The SS-9 Mod Four is the missile with which the
Soviets began to enter their stage of MRV and MIRV technology. First tests
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continued until November 1970 at which time they were suspended. Some
analysts concluded that failure to resume testing in 1971 and 1972 indi-
cated either an abandonment of the MIRV approach or an inability to solve
the problems inherent in MIRV technology. By January 1973, however, new
tests of the Mod Four were detected. Although the deployment level of
the Mod Four is uncertain, it is believed to be capable of delivering
three MRV warheads with a yield of five megatons each.
The SS-11 ICBM ("SEGO") is a two stage missile which utilizes a
storable liquid propellant. This system is the mainstay of the present
ICBM force and accounts for over 50% of those deployed. Three versions
of this system have been identified. Mods One and Two each carry a single
warhead in the range of two megatons. The Mod Two version, however, is
equipped with penetration aids (penaids) which endow a capability of
avoiding ballistic missile defenses, and thus reduces the weapon's
inflight vulnerability. The SS-11 Mod Three is a similar system; however,
it is equipped with three MRV's each having a yield in the kiloton range.
Some SS-11 silos are undergoing conversion to accommodate later generation
SS-17 and SS-19 systems.
The SS-13, nicknamed "SAVAGE", is a three stage solid propellant
system with a one megaton warhead, and is similar to the U.S. Minuteman I
ICBM. This missile is believed capable of deployment in a mobile confi-
guration.
The SSX-16 ICBM is in the final stages of development and is be-
lieved to be the successor to the current SS-13. This system is esti-
mated to be capable of projecting either a single warhead with a yield
in excess of one megaton or several MIRV's. One interesting aspect of
this three stage ICBM is its apparent relationship with the SSX-20
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intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) . The SSX-20 is projected to be
a mobile system somewhat identical to the SSX-16, but lacking one of its
three stages. This development has raised the concern among Western
analysts that the mere addition of a third stage could upgrade this IRBM
79
to an ICBM on short notxce.
The SS-17 ICBM, initially deployed in 1975, is one of the fourth
generation Soviet missile systems, and is believed to be replacing the
SS-11. This system represents a significant advancement in MIRV techno-
logy, increased throw-weight and accuracy, and a reduction in vulnerabi-
lity. The SS-17 is capable of employing a single warhead of five megatons
or four MIRV's in the kiloton range. An additional feature of the SS-17 is
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that it employs the cold-launch technique.
The SS-18 ICBM is the largest and most threatening member of the
latest generation of Soviet missiles. This is a two-stage liquid fueled
system which also utilizes the cold- launch technique. Like the SS-17, it
represents major improvements in ICBM technology. Three versions of the
SS-18 are estimated to be deployed. Mod One employs a single warhead
in the neighborhood of 25 megatons. Some estimates have increased this
figure to 50 megatons. Such a warhead suggests that, despite advancements
in MIRV technology and accuracy, the Soviets still perceive a need for a
massive single warhead. The Mod Two version utilizes eight MIRV's with
a yield of two megatons each. Some estimates of this version have in-
creased the number of MIRV's to 14. The Mod Three model is a lighter and
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more accurate version of the Mod One. In October 1977, tests of a Mod
Four warhead were detected wherein the SS-18 demonstrated an accuracy of
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.15 nautical miles. Some observers have credited the SS-18 with an
83
amazing accuracy of .1 nautical miles.
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The final ICBM currently deployed in the Soviet arsenal is the
84
SS-19, a two-stage liquid fueled missile. This weapon exists in two
versions. The Mod One employs six MIRV's, each with a one to two megaton
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yield. The Mod Two consists of a single five megaton warhead. Again,
this member of the fourth generation incorporates the technological ad-
vances which the Soviets have been able to accomplish in recent years.
This then constitutes the systems currently employed in the
Soviet ICBM arsenal. The weapons range from the high yield and relatively
inaccurate SS-9, to the most modern and sophisticated fourth generation
systems which rival or surpass the once existent technological supremacy
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of the U.S. The July 1978 deployment level of Soviet ICBM's was 1400.
This contrasts with 1054 U.S. ICBM's. Deliverable Soviet warheads are
estimated to number 3,350, as compared to 2,154 for the U.S. The Soviet
equivalent megatonnage is calculated at 3,214 EMT (U.S.: 1313 EMT) , and
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throw weight at 8.4 million pounds (U.S.: 2.2 million). The profile of
the Soviet ICBM arsenal, however, is not to be fixed at this level or to
be limited to these capabilities. While SALT II restricts both sides to
deployment of only one new ICBM, research and development was reportedly
well underway on four new systems which were to constitute the fifth
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generation of ICBM's.
Another feature of the Soviet arsenal, sometimes overlooked, con-
cerns ballistic missiles incapable of meeting the arbitrary range desig-
nation of an ICBM. Under provisions of the SALT negotiations, medium
range ballistic missiles (MRBM) and intermediate range ballistic missiles
(IRBM) are excluded from limitation. The Soviet Union has categorically
refused to subject these systems to the prospect of negotiation, and thus




those systems which are capable of attacking the opponent's homeland.
Nevertheless, there are at least three formidable weapons operational
which should be considered in any assessment of Soviet "strategic"
weapons systems. These forces are targeted against Western Europe and




The SS-4 MRBM, which gained a certain degree of notoriety during
the Cuban Missile Crisis, delivers a one megaton warhead to a range in
91
excess of 1,000 miles. Approximately 500 of these are estimated to be
deployed, primarily targeted against China. The SS-5 IRBM is also capa-
ble of delivering a one megaton weapon, but with a range in the neighbor-
hood of 2100 miles. Estimates peg deployment of this system at 100
missiles targeted at Western Europe. The SS-14 IRBM is similar to the
previous missile, but has a range of 2400 miles and, like the SSX-20
noted above, is deployed in a mobile mode. This feature complicates
92
accurate estimates of the numbers of these systems deployed.
2. Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles
The Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile force of the Soviet
Union constitutes the second largest element of the strategic nuclear
arsenal. Of all strategic forces, the SLBM is the least vulnerable to
compromise. This advantage is the result of concealment and mobility
feature inherent in the submarine. Capable of operating for extended
periods, undetected, and over extreme ranges, the portion of the sub-
marine force at sea represents the strategic weapon most impervious to
counterforce targeting. Due to the fact that SLBM's can be launched
from positions of relative close proximity to the target, flight time,
which equates to warning time, can be significantly reduced. Additionally,
44

deployment of longe range SLBM's in submarines offers the increased advan-
tage of operating at greater distances from the target which thus in-
creases the area to which the opponent must apply antisubmarine warfare
(ASW) coverage. The SLBM force is, however, much less accurate than the
ICBM and currently is not well suited to employment in a counterforce
93
role targeted against ICBM's.
Soviet attempts at development of a submarine launched ballistic
missile are said to date from the early post-war era when they experi-
mented with the launching of German V2 rockets from capsules towed by
94
submarines. Subsequent efforts continued at a fairly slow pace. By
1970, two-thirds of the Soviet SLBM force consisted of outdated subma-
rines armed with three relatively short range missiles. Only 50% of the
submarines were nuclear powered. Since 1970, however, major improvements
in the submarines and the missiles they carry have been accomplished at
95
a rapid pace. In 1970, Soviet SLBM's numbered 304; by 1978, this num-
ber approached 1,000. Figure two illustrates the composition of the
Soviet SLBM force.
The Soviets currently utilize four basic types of fleet ballistic
missile submarines (SSBN). The first, and oldest, is the "GOLF" class
which is the first submarine specifically designed to carry SLBM's. Ini-
tially deployed in 1960, approximately 20 of these diesel powered boats
are still operational. Each are equipped with three launchers which fire
the SSN-4 or SSN-5 missiles. The SSN-4 SLBM, code named "SARK" is a
two stage solid propellant missile designed for surface launch. The war-
head has a range of approximately 350 miles and is capable of a yield in
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the second generation Soviet SLBM, and is similar to the SSN-4, but with an
97
increased range of approximately 750 miles.
The "HOTEL" class, deployed in 1964, is the first Soviet submarine
to use nuclear propulsion. Like the Golf class, these are equipped with
three launchers capable of firing the SSN-5 SLBM. Approximately seven of
98
these boats are operational.
The "Yankee" class represents the bulk of Soviet ballistic mis-
sile submarines. First deployed in 1968, 34 of these systems are now
believed operational. Each carries 16 launchers capable of firing the
SSN-6 ("SAWFLY") SLBM. Analysts have identified three versions of the
SSN-6. The Mod One is a single warhead system with a yield in the one
to two megaton category. The Mod Two version is similar, but with an
increased range. U.S. analysts have noted that the Mod Two is capable
of reaching any U.S. target from the 600 foot depth contour of the coast
of the U.S. The Mod Three version of the SSN-6 employs three MRV's
each with a yield in the kiloton range. The relative accuracy and yield
of each of these models has led Western analysts to conclude that the
99
SSN-6 was designed for use against soft targets only.
The newest generation of Soviet submarines, the "DELTA" class,
was first detected in 1974. Three versions of these boats have been
identified. While all utilize the SSN-8 SLBM, they differ in the number
of launchers carried. The Delta One has 12 tubes. Delta Two has 16 tubes,
and the Delta Three, spotted in mid-1977, has 20. The SSN-8 missile is
capable of projecting a one to two megaton warhead a distance of some
4,800 miles. Additional improvements include more sophisticated guidance
technology and greater accuracy. Official spokesmen have labeled this
47

weapon system as the most threatening SLBM in the Soviet arsenal. Its
capabilities enable the Soviets to attack most U.S. targets from their
101
home ports.
Two newer SLBM's have been identified in the early stages of
deployment. The SSNX-17 is a single warhead vehicle, with a megatonnage
yield, and is capable of a 3,000 mile range. This solid fuel missile is
intended as the replacement for the SSN-6. One Yankee class boat is out-
fitted with this SLBM. The SSN-18 is the solid fuel successor for the
SSN-8. It is equipped with three MIRV's, each in the one to two megaton
102
range, and is capable of reaching distances on the order of 5,000 miles.
The Soviets are also upgrading the quality of their submarine force. A new
class of submarine is under construction. Identified as the "Typhoon"
class, these boats are believed to be similar to the U.S. Trident sub-
103
marine, and are expected to accommodate larger and more numerous missiles.
Although the Soviet ballistic missile submarine fleet presents a
formidable strategic force, it has been evaluated as inferior to the U.S.
fleet of comparable weapons in terms of missile accuracy, number of war-
heads, and vulnerability to ASW techniques. In numbers of submarines and
in size of yield of missiles, however, the Soviet force enjoys a clear
advantage.
One interesting and often overlooked aspect of the Soviet SLBM
force concerns its relatively low alert rate. Official estimates indicate
only approximately 15% of the Soviet SSBN fleet is deployed away from port
at any given time. This compares with roughly 55% for the U.S. There
appear to be two possible reasons for this low alert policy. The first
involves overhaul efficiency. The Soviet Union is estimated to be capable
of overhauling a nuclear submarine in 30 to 36 months. The resulting high
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shipyard workload reduces the number of boats capable of distant deploy-
ment. The second explanation of this low alert rate derives from the
nature of Soviet strategic doctrine. A lower deployment rate of SLBM
forces suggests a strategic posture which places little value on a second-
strike retaliation. Whether accomplished by design or by maintenance
necessity, this feature of SLBM employment indicates Soviet perception of
a relatively low risk of a surprise first strike launched by the U.S.
At the same time, this alert pattern may represent a key indicator of
Soviet military intentions. If the level of SSBN's placed on alert status
increases drastically (during a crisis situation for example), the nature
of Soviet intentions may be more clearly discernable.
On balance, the Soviet SLBM force represents another massive
nuclear arsenal which provides a certain degree of flexibility in selec-
tion of strategic options. Given the inherent protective features of the
submarine force, and considering the fact that SLBM accuracy is best
suited for countervalue employment, this element of Soviet strategic
nuclear weapons permits them to exert a menacing threat to an opponent's
homeland. In fact, one advantage of this force appears to be its potential
for holding the adversary's population hostage.
3. Strategic Bombers
Long range heavy bomber aircraft offer additional means of deli-
very of strategic nuclear weapons. This method of employment has two
significant advantages. First, heavy bombers are capable of delivering
the largest nuclear payload of available strategic systems. Second, the
operational flexibility of this system is perceived, largely in the West,
to enable projection of an increased threat short of attack; this being
obtained by launching strategic bombers but withholding the command to
49

penetrate enemy airspace and deliver weapons. There are, however, two
compensating disadvantages to a strategic bomber force, both of which
relate to vulnerability. Initially, heavy bombers not on alert present
inviting counterforce targets which lack structural hardness, and are
therefore vulnerable to less accurate strategic weapons. The second
disadvantage concerns the aircraft's ability to successfully penetrate
the target area and deliver its weapons. Employment of sophisticated
air defense systems serve to degrade the aircraft's survivability.
Prior to the advent of the ICBM era, the Soviet Union placed a
heavy reliance on strategic aircraft. The number of heavy bombers in
the Soviet arsenal reached a high point of 210 in 1966, and has sub-
sequently declined to the current level of 135. Composition of the
Soviet bomber force is illustrated in Figure Three.
The TU-95 Bear was flight tested in 1954 and has subsequently
been deployed in six versions, all of which continue to be operational.
The MYA-4 Bison is the other heavy bomber in the Soviet inventory.
Both have been estimated to carry one large gravity activated nuclear
weapon as the basic load. Additionally, the Bear can carry the AS-3
"Kangaroo" air to surface missile (ASM) which can be fired 400 miles
108
from its target and produces a yield of one megaton.
The newest Soviet bomber is the Backfire, initially deployed in
1974. This sophisticated "medium" bomber is capable of carrying any of
the free fall munitions in the Soviet arsenal, and any of the strategic
ASM's currently available. Analysts have indicated that decoy missiles
are being developed for the aircraft to assist its ability to penetrate
109
sophisticated defenses. Deployment of the Backfire has caused signi-
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classified as a strategic weapons system, and therefore be subject to
an agreement, or as a medium bomber not subject to limitation. Exami-
nation of its performance characteristics clearly suggests a strategic
capability. The 1978-1979 edition of Jane * s reports that the original
design parameters established for the Backfire included a speed of Mach
2.5 and an unrefueled range of 5,500 to 6,000 miles. The initial ver-
sion, designated Backfire-A was unable to attain the desired range. How-
ever, the redesigned Backfire-B is capable of performing in a strategic
capacity with an increased unrefueled combat range of 7,140 miles.
This exceeds the capability of the U.S. B-52G. The Backfire is
equipped for inflight refueling and has been observed to have remained
112
airborne for 10 hours with one refueling. Thus, range limitations
do not constrain its ability to strike strategic targets. This sophis-
113
ticated aircraft is being produced at a rate of 2.5 per month. By
1978, 80 Backfire-B' s were believed operational. The projected total
deployment force of this aircraft is estimated to be in the range of
114
250 to 400. The final element of the bomber force consists of approxi-
mately 80 air refueling tankers.
The Soviet strategic bomber force appears to be undergoing a
transition designed to upgrade its capability. A new bomber based on the
Tu-144 supersonic transport is being flight tested. A second Soviet
strategic bomber is estimated to be in the advanced development stage,
and may be operational by 1982. This second aircraft is reportedly
similar in performance characteristics to the U.S. B-1. Additionally,
the Soviets are believed capable of developing an air launched cruise
missile (ALCM) comparable to the U.S. design. Recent disclosures indi-
cate the Soviets are testing long range ALCM's with the Backfire bomber
52

as the launch platform. Nevertheless, this element of Soviet strategic
forces is presently inferior in size and sophistication to that of the
118
U.S. This is again reflective of the Soviet decision to concentrate on
missile-delivered ordnance as the mainstay of the strategic arsenal.
4. Strategic Defenses
Strategic defenses fall into two distinct categories. The first,
active defenses, relate to those capabilities and procedures available
with which one can actively engage an opponent's arriving offensive
weapons with the objective of reducing the level of damage inflicted.
The second category, passive defenses, concerns those measures employed
to reduce the lethal effects of an opponent's offensive weapons after
arrival on target. Systems commonly included in the former category
include anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defenses and air defense systems.
Measures associated with the latter category consist of hardening and
dispersal of military and economic targets and civil defense procedures.
Under provisions of a 1974 protocol to the SALT I treaty, the
Soviet Union is permitted to deploy a single ABM system consisting of
not more than 100 missiles and launchers. The Soviets have constructed
four ABM complexes in the vicinity of Moscow. Each of these consists of
16 "Galosh" missiles, two large tracking radars, and four interceptor
guidance tracking radars. The Galosh missile utilizes a multi-megaton
warhead designed to intercept incoming missiles prior to re-entry into
the earth's atmosphere. An improved version of the Galosh missile which
119incorporates a "loiter" capability is believed to have been developed.
This feature enables the stopping and starting of the missile's motors
120
while ground radars attempt to distinguish incoming warheads from decoys.
The effectiveness of the Moscow ABM system has been assessed by U.S.
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analysts as being capable of defending only against small or accidental
121
attacks. The Soviets continue, however, to devote a substantial effort
122
toward research and development of ABM technology.
The strategic air defense forces of the Soviet Union are the
world's largest and most expensive. They consist of over 5,000 early
warning and intercept radars, 12,000 strategic surface to air missiles
123
(SAM), and over 2,600 manned interceptor aircraft. The Soviet ob-
session with air defense of their homeland can easily be understood when
one recalls the influence of their historical experience and the fact that
over 65% of the U.S. strategic equivalent megatonnage could be delivered
via manned aircraft. Despite this massive allocation of resources, the
Soviet anti-bomber defense system is considered somewhat vulnerable to
low altitude penetration. Accordingly, significant efforts are underway
to upgrade air defenses. As an interim measure certain radars have been
elevated to improve their line of sight. The main effort, however,
appears to be oriented toward development of a "lookdown-shootdown"
capability.
The Soviet Union has demonstrated significant initiatives in the
field of passive defenses, most notably in civil defense. Soviet capa-
bility in this area is a highly controversial subject that has been
hotly debated by U.S. observers. The significance of the effectiveness
of a civil defense program can best be grasped when one envisions a
scenario involving the evacuation and protection of population prior to
initiation or threatened execution of a nuclear attack. It must be
noted, however, that this capability alarms only those who embrace a
deterrent strategic doctrine. Such doctrine hinges on population vulnera-
bility. Reduction of that vulnerability has the resultant effect of
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drastically curtailing the credibility of any deterrent based strategy.
This then, is the reason for the controversy in the U.S. over the extent
and effectiveness of Soviet civil defense programs. It is safe to observe
that no similar debate over the "destabilizing" effect of passive defenses
exists within the Soviet Union.
The Soviet civil defense effort is headed by General Colonel A.
Altunin who occupies a position of deputy Minister of Defense. He
directs an organization which includes some 70 general grade officers
and over 100,000 full time civilian and military personnel stationed
125
throughout the country. Civil defense training is compulsory for all
Soviet citizens. Courses are administered in the second, fifth, and
ninth grades of Soviet schools which total 52 hours of instruction.
Each year some 20 million children participate in civil defense exercises
as part of a national military exercise. A 20 hour civil defense course,
which is compulsory for all adults, is repeated annually.
Defense of the population is to be achieved primarily through eva-
cuation to rural areas. In 1974, however, an apparent shift in emphasis
127
from evacuation to shelter construction was noted. The U.S. Secretary
of Defense has observed that the goal of the Soviet civil defense effort
is to protect the political and military leadership, key workers, food
stuffs, and essential equipment. The bulk of the population is to be
128
protected through the use of basement shelters, subways, and evacuation.
Hardening and dispersal of industrial facilities are the primary means of
129
shielding economic capabilities from destruction.
The physical distribution of Soviet population and industrial
capacity appears to support an active civil defense effort. Only 8% of
the population and 25% of the industrial facilities are housed within the
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the ten largest cities of the Soviet Union. The 100 largest urban areas
contain 25% of the population and 50% of the industry. Forty-seven per-
cent of the population and 82% of the industry are dispersed among 1000
130
of the largest Soviet cities.
The effectiveness of the Soviet Civil Defense effort has been
131
questioned by many. Indeed, one must be skeptical of any program pur-
ported to defend a population from the effects of nuclear weapons.
However, it would appear that the level of effectiveness of such programs
is not as significant as the mere existence and magnitude of effort
devoted to these programs. Critics argue that despite elaborate measures
designed to reduce population and industrial vulnerability the Soviet Union
could not absorb a nuclear attack without massive casualties. Undoubtedly
this is true, but those same skeptics may fail to understand those aspects
of the Soviet civil defense effort which are highly effective and the
impact they have as an element of the strategic forces. Imperfect as it
may be, the civil defense program represents a conscious effort to reduce
vulnerability. It thus, reflects the notion that nuclear war is survivable.
C. DEVELOPMENTAL TRENDS
The evolutionary development of Soviet strategic nuclear forces illus-
trates a dramatic commitment to the goal of escaping the perceived stigma
of strategic inferiority. Quantitatively, strategic delivery vehicles
have increased 674%, from 387 in 1963 to 2,610 in 1978. In 1963, ICBM's
represented 23% of the Soviet arsenal (90 missiles). By 1978, however,
this figure increased 1556% to a deployed level of 1400 ICBM's, which
represents 54% of the strategic arsenal. SLBM's accounted for 28% of
nuclear forces in 1963 (107 missiles), and increased 930% by 1978 to a
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level of 995, which accounts for 38% of strategic weapons. During this
same period, long range bomber deployment decreased by 29%, from 190 in
1963 (representing 49% of the 1963 arsenal) to 135 in 1978 (8% of the
132
1978 strategic forces). Figure four illustrates the growth of stra-
tegic forces.
The commitment to qualitative improvements has been no less impres-
sive. Some of these improvements appear to be designed to imitate tech-
nological innovations of the U.S. while others represent initiatives
indicative of a desire to attain breakthroughs which will yield a sub-
stantive edge in the "strategic arms race." Secretary of Defense,
Harold Brown, has candidly acknowledged that during the 1950 's and 1960 *s
the U.S. was responsible (though unwittingly, he maintains) for initiating
the action-reaction pattern in growth and sophistication of strategic
forces. Subsequently, he notes, the Soviet Union's behavior has been
133
"driving the interaction".
The nature of these improvements can be divided into four general
categories for analysis. The first, identified as performance charac-
teristics, includes increases in throw weight, specifically that of stra-
tegic missiles. In 1964, Soviet missiles were capable of propelling
134
800,000 pounds. By 1976, this figure had risen to 8.6 million pounds.
Significant increases in equivalent megatonnage have also been accomplished,
135
i.e., 1102 EMT in 1964, to 4861 EMT in 1976. Major improvements in
the application of MIRV technology have been attained. Finally, signifi-
cant increases in the accuracy of strategic weapons have been achieved.
Advances in these latter two categories, once the hallmark of U.S. stra-
tegic superiority, were major factors contributing to the Soviet Union's
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The second category concerns innovations in employment techniques
and includes adoption of the cold launch capability, development of the
mobile SS-16 and SS-20 missiles, and testing of Fractional Orbital
Bombardment and Depressed Trajectory delivery techniques. Other improve-
ments include upgrading the structural hardness of missile silos,
substitution of silo housed launch control facilities for the more
vulnerable bunker housed installations, and modification of older silos
-I o^
to enable accommodation of newer generation missiles.
The third area of qualitative improvement consists of an energetic
research and development program devoted to the acquisition of opera-
tive technology which will sustain or widen the Soviet lead in strategic
systems. Areas receiving the focus of this effort include ABM research
137
and anti-bomber defenses. Another aspect involves development of a
viable anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon. Indeed, the Department of Defense
credits the Soviet Union with an ASAT capability based on the observa-
1 "58
tion of eight tests against target satellites since 1976. Perhaps,
the most ominous element of the Soviet R&D effort is that devoted to
the perfection of a charged particle beam weapon. In simplistic terms,
this system propels atomic particles at high velocities to destroy tar-
139
gets with high energy concentrations. This weapon has two primary
strategic applications. First, it would provide an ABM capability from
ground stations or orbiting spacecraft. Second, it offers the potential
for generation of a high level radiation beam from a space platform
which could be targeted on earth to produce damage similar to that
associated with a "neutron bomb." Large scale employment of this
weapon could enable the destruction of the targeted population with
virtually no damage to the physical surroundings. Soviet R&D programs
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are reported to be proceeding toward the acquisition of each of these
140
capabilities. Some estimates project Soviet deployment of this wea-
141
pon in an ABM mode as early as 1980.
The final and related element of qualitative improvement demonstra-
ted by the Soviet Union is a penchant for the continued rejuvenation of
strategic forces. As has been noted above, while deploying the fourth
generation of ICBM's, work is nearing completion on yet a fifth. Simi-
lar developments are occurring in Soviet submarines and SLBM's. Signi-
ficant efforts are underway to upgrade the sophistication of aircraft
delivered strategic weapons.
The trend in development of Soviet strategic nuclear forces appears
unmistakable. Secretary of Defense Brown has observed that the Russians
have built their missile forces to the limits of the SALT I agreement.
Moreover, he has indicated that there is no doubt about the Soviet abi-
lity to deploy more strategic weapons than they are now believed to be
142
programming. One might well ask what significance these trends por-
tend. Secretary Brown has provided the following assessment:
Exactly what the Soviets are trying to accomplish with their
large and growing strategic capabilities is uncertain. Perhaps
it is pure deterrence. But if it is, their definition of pure
deterrence appears quite different from our own... Much of what
they are doing both offensively and defensively coincides with
the actions that would support a damage limiting strategy. And
it is within the realm of possibility that they are attempting
to acquire what have been called 'war winning' capabilities.
Whatever the intentions and motives the Soviets have, we face
two related problems as the result of their activities. They
are the increasing vulnerability of the U.S. ICBM force, and the
expanding scope of Soviet active and passive defenses.
D. STATIC BALANCE OF STRATEGIC POWER
Although the subject of this inquiry is Soviet strategic nuclear
forces, it is felt appropriate to provide a brief comparison of Soviet
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capabilities with those of the U.S. This will serve to highlight some
of the asymmetries in force composition which will reveal the different
doctrinal perspectives of each country, indicate weaknesses of either
side in specific areas of force composition, and may surface certain
latent features of the strategic arsenals which would yield insight as
to future developments in the "strategic arms race."
At the outset, it is necessary to indicate that a statistical ren-
dition of the static balance of strategic nuclear forces has its limi-
tations. Apart from the speculative nature of the quantitative composition
of Soviet forces, accurate assessment of qualitative capabilities pre-
sents a formidable obstacle to the ultimate validity of any comparison.
Basic data on Soviet forces is derived from sanitized intelligence which
is subject to the prejudices of both the means of collection and the
analyst's interpretation. This is made more complex by the Soviet pen-
chant for employing extensive cover and deception techniques to disguise
actual capabilities and intentions, not to mention the fact that the
Soviet Union is a closed society. While a greater degree of confidence
can be placed in the quantitative and qualitative composition of U.S.
strategic forces, various uncertainties still exist. Additionally, a
static comparison fails to reveal the impact of situational events on
the performance capabilities of strategic forces. For example, the
intensification of an international crisis may cause either actor to
implement procedures which may serve to upgrade the comparative capa-
bility of his forces.
A final qualification to the validity of a statistical balance of
forces concerns the recent emphasis placed on the strategic connotation
of the terms "superiority", "parity", and "inferiority". For reasons
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stated above these terms are at best imprecise when applied to the full
spectrum of strategic forces. Unless one is careful to discriminate
among the various "estimated" capabilities of the individual components
of that spectrum, and consider the offsetting capabilities of other
weapons systems classed as strategic, one will be unable to arrive at
a sober and realistic comparison.
Most public perception of the nature of the strategic balance in the
West is determined by two basic variables - who has the most and who has
the newest. On initial examination, the Soviet Union enjoys a clear
144
lead in the former category and a massive lead in the latter. A more
accurate statistical assessment may be obtained when one examines the
substantive capabilities of each force. For example, the static compa-
rison of SLBM's would indicate a significant Soviet lead (U.S.: 656,
U.S.S.R. : 995); however, when one views this element of strategic wea-
pons in terms of independently targetable warheads, the picture is
quite different (U.S.: 5,120, U.S.S.R.: 995). It is thus necessary to
proceed beyond superficial calculations to ascertain a more meaningful
comparison. Figure five represents an attempt to accomplish this.
Of significance is the emphasis each state accords the various stra-
tegic forces. Figure six illustrates the relative distribution of each
arsenal among the three offensive delivery systems. The Soviet Union
places the preponderance of its strategic military power in the ICBM
category. The second priority is allocated the SLBM force. A dispro-
portionately low emphasis is placed on the strategic bomber element.
In contrast, the U.S. relies on the bomber element to deliver the bulk









US USSR US USSR US USSR
ICBM's:
Launchers Deployed 1054 1400 +346 33%
Warheads 2154 3350 +1196 56%
Equivalent Megatonnage 1313 3214 +1901 145%
Throw Weight
(million lbs) 2.2 8.4 +6.2 282%
SLBM's:
Launchers Deployed 656 995 +339 52%
Warheads 5120 995 +4125 415%
Equivalent Megatonnage 837 1400 +563 67%
Throw Weight
(million lbs) 1.1 1.5 +.4 36%
STRATEGIC BOMBERS:
Bombers Deployed 432 215 +217 101%
Deliverable Weapons 3973 290 +3683 1270%
c









FIGURE 5: Strategic Balance
a. As of July 1978
b. Independently targe table warheads
c. EMT = Y for yields below one megaton. For yields larger than one
megaton, the lower scaling law of Y is used. Totals assume maximum
yield values indicated in figures one and two.
d. Figures include 366 B-52's and 66 FB-lllA's for the US and 100 Bear,
35 Bison, and 80 Backfire for the USSR.
Author's estimates derived from The Military Balance 1976-1977, 1977-1978
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FIGURE 6: Distribution of Strategic Forces
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The ultimate question which arises when one concludes an assess-
ment of the composition of a strategic arsenal relates to the effects
resulting from the employment of that arsenal in an attack. Numerous
observers have posited various calculations which project the effects of
a nuclear exchange under different scenarios. The validity of these
calculations may be analogous to that obtained in estimating the number
of grains of sand remaining on a beach after the arrival of a tidal wave.
Many of the variables associated with the above evaluation of the static
balance of power operate to cloud the results of these estimates. Addi-
tionally, the outcome of a nuclear attack will depend primarily on the
nature of the targets involved and the degree to which the targeted state
is able to anticipate the attack.
Unclassified U.S. estimates indicate that a comprehensive Soviet
attack on all U.S. ICBM's, strategic bombers, and SSBN bases would yield
six to ten million casualties. A similar attack on Soviet forces is
estimated to produce fewer casualties owing primarily to population den-
sity and the lower yield of U.S. weapons. In a general war, the Soviets
are estimated capable of killing 80 to 120 million Americans. This
contrasts with Department of Defense calculations which indicate similar
U.S. attacks would yield 50 to 100 million Soviet deaths without civil
145defense, and 30 to 80 million with minimal civil defense. The danger
of these calculations, however, lies not in their accuracy, but in the
possible influence they may exert on the perceptions (and resultant
behavior) of an assertive decision maker in a crisis environment of
heightened international tension.
This assessment of the strategic forces of the Soviet Union was
introduced as an attempt to provide insight into two basic but related
65

questions. First, does the strategic arsenal adequately support national
security objectives? Second, what type of doctrine would operate to pro-
duce a strategic arsenal with the complexion of that of the Soviet Union?
The first question is answered positively. Soviet strategic forces
are increasingly capable of supporting the full spectrum of military
options, i.e., defend, deter, attack, and can thus be applied in pursuit
of a wide range of desired national objectives. While the strategic
arsenal has not yet reached the level at which it can function as a
viable tool of political coercion, there is some evidence to suggest
that it is perceived to have produced desired political objectives.
Consider for example, the recognition of equality among superpowers con-
tained in the 1972 bilateral agreements. The Soviets view this recog-
nition as one of U.S. acquiescence caused wholely by a shift in the
"correlation of world forces." The most significant "shift" in this
correlation occurred in the category of strategic military power, pri-
marily as a result of the growth of the Soviet arsenal. Once this logic
is factored out, it becomes apparent that continued pursuit of massive
strategic force levels is perceived to facilitate additional "shifts"
in the correlation of forces which further Soviet objectives. The size,
composition, and continued growth and modernization of the Soviet arse-
nal tend to support this observation. In this context, it is also help-
ful to recall the fact that the Soviet Union has built its forces to
the limits of SALT I.
The composition of Soviet strategic forces also reveals much about
Soviet doctrine. The most striking feature of this arsenal, and the
trends displayed in its development, is the total rejection of the
principles of deterrence through assured destruction. It is necessary
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to distinguish between deterrence as a de facto condition resulting from
a certain strategic balance of power and deterrence as a strategic con-
cept. Clearly, the Soviets recognize the former interpretation. The
nature of their strategic forces, however, violates the conceptual
tenets of an assured destruction deterrent strategy, a key element being
some degree of mutual vulnerability. Soviet force developments and
strategic programs are designed to reduce vulnerability across the board
and to limit damage to the maximum extent possible. At the same time,
these forces are structured to exploit the vulnerabilities of opposing
strategic arsenals.
The notion of mutual vulnerability is naturally repugnant to the
Soviet mind. Implicit within this concept is the notion of mutual
trust - a quality not to be found in the Soviet experience. The Soviet
approach is much more realistic and self-reliant. They have discarded
the idealistic abstraction that the enormous consequences of a nuclear
exchange alone function to make its occurrence unlikely. Their stra-
tegic forces represent a rational attempt to cope with the possibility
of a nuclear contest. For the Soviets, to "cope" is synonymous with
"to succeed and survive".
The nature and composition of the Soviet strategic arsenal clearly
supports a war fighting rather than an assured destruction doctrine.
The heavy reliance on missile delivered weapons with large throw weight
capabilities; the number of warheads with massive levels of destructive
power; and the increased accuracy of the newer weapons serve to reinforce
this doctrine. Soviet ICBM's are becoming formidable counterforce
weapons. The accuracy and yield combination of the SS-18 alone provides
the capability of destroying even the most hardened target. Consider
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what this force will be capable of once fully modernized by the replace-
ment of older systems with the current generation SS-17's, SS-18's,
and SS-19*s, not to mention the "new" missile authorized under SALT II.
Former Secretary of Defense Schlesinger observed that the Soviets would
require a total of 2,158 warheads to attack each U.S. ICBM site with
two weapons and each nuclear submarine and Strategic Air Command base
146
with one weapon. The Soviet ICBM force presently exceeds this require-
ment by over 1,000 warheads. Once fully modernized, this arsenal could
be equipped with upwards of 5,000 powerful and highly accurate MIRVed
warheads within the limits of SALT II.
The one strategic capability necessary to complete the Soviet nuclear
war fighting arsenal is an effective ABM. Although this is prohibited
under SALT I, the impressive R&D effort devoted to perfection of ABM
technology (especially particle beam) suggests a Soviet desire to have
this defensive mechanism "on the shelf" ready for deployment. An ener-
getic civil defense program provides an interim and supplemental defense.
Deployment of a viable ABM system at some point in the future, coupled
with an effective first-strike ICBM force and adequate civil defense
would complete the necessary counterforce/damage limitation require-
ments for a comprehensive war fighting posture.
This war fighting disposition does not, however, suggest a Soviet
desire to prosecute such a war. The avoidance of this type of conflict
is a high priority objective. However, the Soviet view is that war can
best be avoided if the U.S.S.R. is capable of fighting it. This capa-
bility is to be maintained with the continued growth and modernization
of the strategic arsenal.
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IV. STRATEGIC DOCTRINE OF THE SOVIET UNION
A. SOURCES OF SOVIET DOCTRINE
This examination of doctrinal thought is based exclusively on
original Soviet sources. The credibility of the sources employed
herein follows from several objective conditions. First, the Soviet
Union enjoys no exemption from the need to communicate among its
people. Despite the restrictive totalitarian nature of Soviet society,
it is faced with the requirement of informing, educating, and preparing
the population on a wide spectrum of issues, both foreign and domestic.
This need becomes even more critical in the field of military affairs,
because a unified informed officer corps is essential for the proper
conduct of any military operation. Second, the prohibition of unautho-
rized dissent in Soviet military writings lends credence to that which
is published. All military publications are carefully scrutinized and
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censored. That which is printed thus reflects leadership sanction.
The monotonous consistency of Soviet military writings is an addi-
tional feature indicative of both its credibility and its continuity.
The continuous repetition of identical concepts and doctrinal pronounce-
ments by authors of various backgrounds and experiences serves to
sanctify those concepts. Additionally, the similarity of phrases used
to express the Soviet view of the nature and conduct of modem war
functions to highlight key doctrinal principles.
The majority of Soviet sources utilized in this analysis date
roughly from 1965 to 1975. Despite radical changes in the international
situation during this period, an amazing consistency of doctrinal thought
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is evident. When one considers that during this decade the Soviet
Union rose from a position of distinct strategic inferiority to parity
and beyond, encountered several international crisis situations,
engaged in unprecedented strategic arms limitation negotiations, and
attained political recognition of equality among superpowers, one
might expect to witness a corresponding transition in military thought.
This is not the case. The views of modern war and its conduct expres-
sed in 1965 are to be found in contemporary writings. If any change
can be discerned, it is in the degree of sophistication with which
these views are expressed. This period is significant from another
perspective. The writings which emerged during this decade were
sanctioned by the present Soviet regime, and thus reflect current
military thinking.
This study of doctrinal writings has revealed what appears to be
three general categories of military authors. The first consists of
those who discourse on the theoretical/ ideological plane, devoting the
bulk of their efforts to the discussion of the application of Marxist-
Leninist philosophy to matters military. Members of this category in-
clude military academicians. The second element consists of those mili-
tary authors who concern themselves with the application of doctrinal
thinking to the realities of military operations. Frequently addressing
tactical issues, they incorporate the principles expressed by the ideo-
logues into military sensible procedures. This element consists largely
of combat arms officers who are empowered with military leadership res-
ponsibilities. The third category of authors appear to consolidate the
two former. Having extensive military experience and occupying a promi-
nent position in the establishment, these authors frequently address
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themselves to the integration of the theoretical and the tactical. In-
cluded in this category would be authoritative military figures. Apart
from the specific focus of each group of authors, all are consistent
in their approach to military issues. Thus, regardless of which cate-
gory an author represents, the substance of his contribution may contain
significant doctrinal implications. Here again, it is helpful to recall
that publication in an official source legitimizes content.
One interesting feature of Soviet military writings which tends to
permeate all "educational" articles in the military press is their pen-
chant for exclusive reliance on non-Soviet examples to illustrate new
technologies, weapon systems, etc. One example is the collection en-
titled Scientific-Technical Progress and the Revolution in Military
Affairs
,
edited by Gen. Col. N. A. Lomov, wherein the workings of U.S.
strategic weapons systems are described as a vehicle for acquainting
the audience with the nature of modem weapons. Extensive use of open
source material on U.S. systems and capabilities is made to educate and
inform. It is extremely rare to find reference to the characteristics
of Soviet weapon systems. This predisposition to secrecy parallels the
Soviet decision in SALT I to utilize U.S. estimates of the numbers and
capabilities of Soviet strategic weapons as the basis for negotiation
rather than disclose actual characteristics of Soviet systems.
Another aspect of Soviet military writings which is illustrative of
the means used to communicate strategic principles is a further reliance
on Western sources to inform and endorse certain delicate or provocative
strategic concepts. One analyst has observed that Soviet description of
subjects expressed in Western sources without criticism is tantamount to
implicit endorsement. This tactic is frequently invoked. For example.
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when discussing the delicate issue of a surprise first strike, numerous
authors, using Western military sources, merely recount how important
the issue of surprise can be in the conduct of a nuclear war. There
is no overt advocacy of the strategic utility of a surprise first
strike (for to do so would provoke grave concern both at home and
abroad), but neither is the option criticized. The reader cannot
avoid reaching the conclusion that such an approach could endow the
Soviet Union with immeasurable advantages. Techniques as subtle as
these find frequent expression in Soviet military writings.
Among the numerous sources employed in this examination, two appear
worthy of special comment. The "Soviet Military Thought" series,
published under the auspices of the U.S. Air Force, consists of 14
volumes of Soviet writings translated from such Soviet sources as The
Of f icer ' s Library and other works presented by Voyenizdat, the Military
Publishing House of the Ministry of Defense of the U.S.S.R. The
purpose of The Officer's Library , which consists of 17 volumes, is to
"arm the reader with a knowledge of the fundamental changes which have
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taken place in recent years in military affairs." Other volumes of
"Soviet Military Thought" are introduced with the caveat, "This book
is designed for officers and generals of the Soviet Army." A
thorough reading of this series yields significant insight on the
Soviet view of military doctrine, strategy, and tactics.
Voyennaya My si' (Military Thought) is the classified monthly jour-
nal of the Soviet Ministry of Defense and the Soviet General Staff.
By its own admission, it is the
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basic military-theoretical organ of the Ministry of Defense... It
organized and published materials on a wide circle of problems of
the theory and practice of Military Affairs at a level which chiefly
satisfied the inquiries of senior and higher echelons of the command
staff and personnel.
Penkovskii spoke of, and passed to Western intelligence, a top secret
"Special Collection" of this journal in the early 1960's. In his
memoirs he expressed chagrin at the content of the top secret special
collection, specifically with regard to the emergence of a "new (nuclear)
military doctrine." Penkovskii summarized this doctrine, as expressed
in the special edition, as follows:
First, let me say that virtually all authors recognize the impor-
tance of the first thermonuclear strike. . .Secondly , strategic
nuclear missiles, which will play a tremendous part in the initial
stages of war, will also make it possible to achieve the necessary
strategic goals of the war within the shortest possible time...
A
future war will begin with a sudden nuclear strike against the
enemy. There will be no declaration of war. . .When circumstances
are favorable for delivering the first nuclear strike, the Soviet
Union will deliver this strike under the pretense of defending
itself -from an aggressor. In this way it will seize the initia-
tive.
The reader will subsequently note that the content of the issues of
Voyennaya Mysl' employed in this examination of Soviet doctrine bears
a striking resemblance to the substance of the special collection which
alarmed Penkovskii.
Issues of this jouimal were acquired by the Central Intelligence
Agency, presumably soon after publication in Moscow. Selected issues
were translated by the CIA Foreign Press Information Services, CIA
Foreign Documents Division, and the Foreign Broadcast Information Ser-
vice some months after the date of each issue. On 2 December 1976,
a total of 58 issues of Voyennaya Mysl* were declassified and made
available on microfiche. These journals, consisting of nearly 6,000
pages, were published in the Soviet Union during the period 1963 to 1969.
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The subject content of Voyennaya My si* covers a wide variety of
military issues ranging from theoretical ("Concerning the Nature and
Classification of Certain Phenomena in Armed Struggle") to the provo-
cative ("Modern Warfare and Surprise Attack") and to basic tactical
requirements ("Calculating a March When Rubble and Obstacles Block
March Routes"). The journal represents a very serious and realistic
approach to the discussion and resolution of certain issues and problems
perceived by the Soviet military elite to exist with regard to the
conduct of modem war.
B. DOCTRINE DEFINED
In Western usage, the term military doctrine defines a set of funda-
mental principles employed by military forces as a guide to the accom-
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plishment of objectives. In Soviet usage, the term has quite a
different meaning. The Soviet definition of military doctrine has a
wider application and incorporates political considerations as the basic
substance of doctrine. Technically defined, voyennaya doktrina is:
"A nation's officially accepted system of scientifically founded views
on the nature of modern wars and the use of armed forces in them, and
also on the requirements arising from these views regarding the country
and its armed forces being made ready for war,"
It is first a political statement on the perceived nature and char-
acter of modem warfare and second a statement on the military methods
of waging war. There are two aspects of Soviet military doctrine: the
political and the military-technical. The former is "concerned with
the political evaluation of the military tasks of the state," and
is clearly the dominant consideration in the formation of doctrine.
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The latter aspect concerns the conduct of war and "determines the mili-
tary-technical tasks of the armed forces, and the means, methods, and
forms of armed combat." These two elements converge in the form of
military doctrine to yield "the political policy of the Party and the
158
Soviet government in the military field." Soviet doctrine, as a
political statement, functions to define war and prepare the state for
its conduct. It identifies the enemy to be faced in a future war,
indicates the type of war that will be fought, prescribes the composi-
tion and nature of forces needed in war, directs adequate preparation
159
for war, and determines the methods of waging war. The foundation
of military doctrine, in the Soviet view, is the understanding of the
, . . 160
essence of war as the continuation of politics.
The substance of military doctrine is dependent upon the current
state of affairs in the world arena, to include "foreign and domestic
policy, the sociopolitical and economic system, level of production,
status of means for conducting war, and the geographic position" of the
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combatants. Soviet military doctrine is not immutable but develops
on the basis of "the alignment of political forces in the world and the
policy followed by the state, the status of the country's economy,
improvements in means of conducting war, and the growth in combat capa-
bilities of the Armed Forces."
In the Soviet lexicon, military science is subordinate to military
doctrine and consists of a system of knowledge concerning the prepara-
tion for and waging of war. Included within this discipline are various
topical subdivisions. The most important of these is the theory of
ICO
military art, which is defined as:
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The theory and practice of engaging in combat, operations, and
armed conflict as a whole, with the use of all the resources of
the service branches and Services of the Armed Forces, and also
support of combat activities in every regard. Military art...
includes tactics, operational art, and strategy, which consti-
tute an organic unit and are interdependent.
The three sub-components of military art relate to individual tiers
of activity which are linked in a progression leading to the accomplish-
ment of the objective in war-victory. Tactics concern the actual mili-
tary operations at maneuver echelons. Operational art addresses the
management and integration of joint and independent operations on a
broader scale such as an entire theater of military operations. The
most important element of military art is strategy, which involves the
comprehensive effort to attain victory in war. Strategy is dependent
upon military doctrine, and is closely linked to a state's economic
^., . . 165
capabilities.
Historically, the Soviets viewed the linkage between each element of
military art as the means of attaining victory. Thus, tactical suc-
cesses lead to operational successes which, in turn, produce strategic
successes. In the Soviet assessment, the introduction of long-range
nuclear weapons has altered this progression, making it possible to
achieve strategic objectives directly. No longer is it necessary to
turn tactical victories into operational successes, etc.
There is a close relationship between military doctrine and stra-
tegy. Doctrine can be viewed as a policy statement, and strategy as
policy execution. During peacetime, doctrine governs the planning and
preparation for war. In wartime, strategy implements doctrine.
Having established the definitive nature of Soviet doctrinal con-
cepts, it is now appropriate to take a preliminary look at the substance
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of Soviet military doctrine. Various Soviet pronouncements have sum-
marized the doctrine as being offensive in character; however.
The Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community
do not intend to attack anyone at all; but, if they are attacked,
they will wage the war imposed upon them by their enemies in the
most offensive fashion in order to bring about the rapid defeat
of those enemies.
Another key principle of Soviet doctrine is the assignment of the deci-
sive role in war to nuclear weapons, not to preclude, however, the need
for the fully coordinated employment of all elements of the Soviet Armed
Forces to achieve success.
The most interesting feature of this characterization of Soviet
doctrine is the total absence of any theoretical content. When one
speaks of strategic doctrine in the West, one conjures shades of deter-
rence theory, e.g., mutual destruction, flexible response, etc. In
essence, this Western theoretical approach equates to the political ab-
straction and application of artificial military calculations to the
problems associated with nuclear war. Military doctrine in the West
amounts to what is simply a political statement designed to avoid nuclear
war. Its military content is limited. One finds none of this in Soviet
doctrine. Instead, the Soviets concern themselves with a realistic
approach (unencumbered with abstraction) to the rational treatment of
contemporary military issues. Although Soviet military doctrine is
closely dependent upon the political policy of the state, its content
is devoid of political utility.
Robert Legvold has made the astute observation that the Soviet Union
lacks a military doctrine in the Western sense and substitutes instead
common military strategy, i.e., the operational concepts of war.
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This he contrasts with the U.S. approach to the creation of a military
doctrine viz deterrence, which is "an explicit intellectual construction,
invented by civilians, and rooted in psychological or game theory, not
the organizational theory of military science." While this subtle
distinction can easily be lost in semantic debate, the key issue remains
the basic point of departure when formulating military doctrine. In U.S.
circles, it is an abstract theoretical calculation of how nuclear war
can be avoided. In the Soviet view, military doctrine lacks the abstract
theory and substitutes instead a war fighting strategy. This feature of
Soviet doctrine will be made more lucid as the Soviet perception of
various strategic principles is examined in detail.
C. LESSONS OF HISTORY
The Soviet military devotes considerable effort to the analytical
study of political-military history, which is viewed as an important
172
source for the development of military doctrine and strategy. In
addition to isolating specific strategic lessons emerging from the course
of military history, the Soviets believe its analysis will assist in
173directing the development of future weapons and forces. The concen-
tration of this effort is on the military history of the twentieth cen-
tury, most notably on the "Great Patriotic War." The lessons proffered
by Germany in World War II have received no greater study than that which
has been allocated by the Soviet Union. The memories associated with
this conflict has been institutionalized and will not soon be forgotten.
Next to the "revolution in military affairs" introduced as a result of
nuclear weapons, the lessons of this war constitute the most significant
influence on current Soviet military doctrine and strategy. Soviet
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wi-itings on the military history of the Great Patriotic War represent
one of the few issues on which the Soviet Union is willing to admit
mistakes. Most of the errors of the war, and thus most of the lessons
of its history, concern the period immediately prior to its outbreak
and its initial stages. Inability to predict the German offensive on
the Eastern Front constitute the first teaching of this experience.
The increasingly difficult trials which our armed forces suffered
during the very first hours of the war were compounded by a number
of serious errors. I. V. Stalin made an error in appraising the
military-political atmosphere on the eve of the war, relating
mainly to determining the timing of Fascist Germany's attack on
the Soviet Union.
The next significant lesson of the war concerned the total lack of
preparation for its conduct. The forces were not adequately positioned
to oppose the invasion and the readiness level of military formations
was not upgraded from the peacetime standard. Failure to grasp the
significance of the initial period of the war is another error which
led to serious consequences.
Soviet military thought had... on the whole correctly determined
the nature of the future war, the means and forms of armed con-
flict. However, it had not yet sufficiently and fully analyzed
the radical changes introduced in the already available experience
of World War II on the content and nature of the initial period
of the war. The consequences of the powerful and sudden attack
inflicted on our^country were the most dire for the Soviet People
and their army.
The skillful application of the element of surprise is perhaps the
single most important lesson the Soviets have taken from the war. The
inseparable linkage of surprise with acquisition of the strategic ini-
tiative is viewed as a major determinant of the course and outcome of
war. Germany's employment of surprise enabled her to seize the stra-




A sneak attack against the U.S.S.R. enabled Nazi Germany in 1941
to achieve certain strategic successes. Although it did not pre-
determine the outcome of the war as a whole, it significantly com-
plicated the job of defeating the enemy, dragged out^^(^stilities
to almost four years and cost us immense casualties.
The catastrophic nature of the Soviet experience in World War II
is the source of a final lesson of her military history. "The war—
caused tremendous losses in our country. Over 20 million Soviet
people perished... We lost about 30% of the country's natural resources..
Thousands of cities and villages, tens of thousands of plants and
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factories. . .lay in ruins..." The lessons of the war have had pro-
found influence on Soviet military and political thought. Military
writings frequently make reference to the conviction that a similar
experience will never again be allowed.
D. THE NATURE OF MODERN WAR
In accordance with the Soviet definition of military doctrine, a
significant effort has been devoted to constructing a theory of a modern
world war. This has led to the conclusion that a future world war will
have three characteristic features. First, it will be a class war con-
ducted between capitalism and socialism (presumably, a Sino-Soviet
conflict would not develop into a world war). Second, it will be a
coalition war in the sense that it will be international in scope and
involve two camps as represented by the two classes. Finally, it will
180
be a thermonuclear war. The basic military view of war proceeds from
acceptance of the last characteristic.
A fundamental element of Soviet strategic thinking is the reconci-
liation of the existence of nuclear weapons with the conduct of war.
The introduction of nuclear weapons produced what has been termed a
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revolution in military affairs, this being caused primarily by the
effectiveness of such weapons, the ranges at which they can be delivered,
181
and the increased importance of the time factor. This revolution has
radically altered the methods of waging war. First, the traditional
distinction between the "front" and the "rear" has been erased. "This
means that in contrast to the past, the entire economy, the state admini-
strative system, and the vital centers of the warring sides, regardless
of their remoteness, in a nuclear world war become targets for destruction
182just as the immediate military objectives." Second, the outcome of a
war can be decided during its initial stages. "A most important quali-
tative feature of modem war is the possibility of directly achieving
183
strategic results by using strategic nuclear forces." Another result
of this revolution is its alteration of traditional military missions,
"The armed forces under conditions of a nuclear war should be able to
carry out missions which differ sharply from the missions which they
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carried out in the past." The final characteristic which has been
mentioned, concerns an increase in the importance of the element of sur-
prise. "The revolution in military affairs to a significant degree has
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raised the importance of the surprise factor."
Of significance is the Soviet military acceptance of the nuclear
weapon as an integral element of weaponry. As such, nuclear weapons
merely represent an additional means of waging war, no different from
the alteration of warfare caused by the introduction of the catapult,
the rifle, or the tank. A 1973 article in Red Star maintained "...the
appearance of any weapon, including a nuclear weapon, exerts tremendous
influence on the methods and forms of warfare. But no weapon can change
the political essence of war." A similar acceptance was voiced in an
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early Voyennaya Mysl' article. "The military potential of a state, its
ability to wage war and win victory, now is primarily determined by its
capability of using the power within the nucleus as the basic source of
187
firepower in combination with highly effective rocket means of delivery."
The Soviet embracement of nuclear weapons is clearly reflected in
writings dealing with all levels of combat. One essential theme of the
authoritative work entitled The Basic Principles of Operational Art and
Tactics by Colonel Vasiliy Savkin, of the Frunze Military Academy, is the
integration of nuclear weapons on the battlefield as an additional aid
to victory. One officer, commenting on the basic tactical utility of
such weapons, maintains: "If we look at the time now required to breach
an enemy's defenses with nuclear missiles, we will see that a zone of
field fortifications erected for defensive purposes can be destroyed
188
almost instantaneously." Nuclear weapons are viewed equally as effec-
tive when applied in pursuit of strategic objectives. Marshal Grechko
advised:
Nuclear missiles introduced fundamental changes in strategy. They
increased by many times the role of strategy in winning war goals.
While before, including World War II, strategic planners possessed
relatively limited means for taking direct action against distant
enemy installations, with the adoption of nuclear missiles, they
obtained the opportunity of directly accomplishing major strategic
missions and^^thus exerting a decisive influence on the entire course
of the war.
Thus, nuclear weapons are viewed not only as another complement to a
military arsenal, but as the basic and decisive weapon of modem warfare.
The Soviets view war as being guided by a series of independent laws.
"War, as any other social phenomenon, develops on the basis of objective
laws which are independent of man's volition. . .The general laws which




missile war as well..." Knowledge of these laws, and of the conditions




Forms of military action in war are limited to two fundamental cate-
gories: "...now, as well as many centuries ago, there exist only two
192
interrelated types of armed struggle—offensive and defensive." The
primacy of the former is axiomatic in Soviet military thought, and is
193
recognized as the only means of achieving victory. This penchant for
the offensive also influences the conduct of defensive operations:
"...nuclear weapons have established even more firmly the role of attack
as the decisive form of military action and have made it necessary to
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accomplish even defensive tasks by active offensive actions."
There is seldom a distinction drawn between a future world war and
a nuclear war in Soviet military writing. The two are viewed as inse-
parable due primarily to the belief that a world war will inevitably
escalate to a fight to the death among the protagonists. With stakes as
high as these, any and all means of waging such a war are legitimized.
The decisiveness of this conflict is explained by the fact that when
diametrically opposed social systems clash, the ultimate goal of the
195
warring parties will be the total destruction of the opponent. One
of the more volatile comments on this subject contained in the pages of
Voyennaya Mysl* maintains: "The existence of the powerful modem weapon
in the hands of a socialist state confronted the aggressive militaristic
forces with the entirely real prospect of being wiped off the face of
196
the earth if they attempted to start a new world war. General Major
Milovidov, one of the most articulate military spokesmen of the 1970's,
summarized the totality of a future world war in a 1973 article of Red
83

Star. "...It was decided unanimously that it is wrong to see war merely
as an armed struggle, even though the latter constitutes the specific and
determining feature of war. In an armed struggle, all means are subordi-
197
nate to the interests of victory ." The basic military definition of
"nuclear missile warfare," to which so much attention is paid in mili-
tary writings, speaks directly to the ultimate nature of a future world
war. Such conflict is defined as "warfare in which the decisive means
of attaining victory in battle, in an operation, and in armed combat as
a whole, is the nuclear missile—used without restraint by all services
—
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and above all the strategic nuclear weapon."
Thus, in the Soviet view, there are few gray areas with regard to the
nature of a future world war. Such conflict "stands before mankind in
two aspects, i.e., of the necessity of its prevention and the possibility
199
of its being waged." The substance of Soviet strategic doctrine pro-
ceeds, therefore, from the latter aspect, and maintains that should a
world war occur, it will involve the most decisive combat witnessed in
the annals of civilization, will unfold pursuant to a set of objective
laws, will inevitably require the use of nuclear weapons, and will demand
the unrestricted application of all means available to insure success.
With this as the basic point of departure, Soviet military thought holds
that it is necessary to implement several measures preparatory to the
outbreak of hostilities, most notably, the accumulation of military
superiority and the continuous preparation for war.
E. WAR PREPARATION
The Soviets recognize that the decisiveness of a future war dictates
that certain immediate requirements be satisfied in preparation for its
possible outbreak. Significant attention is paid this subject in military
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and political writings. The need for preparation for potential conflict
has as its origin the Soviet historical experience and the nature of a
modern war. The increased significance of the time factor is the pri-
mary consideration which necessitates thorough preparation. Former
Minister of Defense Malinovskiy commented in Voyennaya Mysl' on this
essential feature.
. . .We proceed from the fact that its (modem war) initial period has
now become the decisive and most responsible and intensive stage.
The importance of this period is determined by the fact that the
first concentrated nuclear attacks can in great measure predetermine
the entire successive course of the war, result in immense losses,
and place the people and the country in an exceptionally difficult
position. For this reason, tremendous importance attaches to the
conduct, while still in peacetime, of all round-preparation of the
country and armed forces to resist aggression.
The requirement to prepare is also dictated by economic conditions.
The Soviets feel that the duration of a future war may preclude the
opportunity of mobilizing industrial facilities to support a war effort.
"One must also consider the possibility of a sudden outbreak of war,
which may result in very difficult conditions for intensification of
military industry. In this connection, the necessary measures have to
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be taken in time of peace."
A final need for preparatory measures relates to the military
requirements of readiness. Marshal of the Soviet Union Sokolovskiy
advised readers of Voyennaya Mysl' in October 1968 that
...The consuming, unprecedentedly destructive nature of nuclear
war forces us to maintain in constant readiness, even in peace-
time, such a structure of armed forces. . .which would enable us
to carry out the strategic missions of a general nuclear war
in a short period^of time and in the most complicated conditions
of a situation.
The methods of preparation can be viewed from three perspectives:
those allocated the military, economic, and civilian sectors of Soviet
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society. Military preparations concern acquisition of state of the art
weapons systems. A brief examination of the Soviet military arsenal
will reveal the high priority allocated this requirement. Constant readi-
ness is another element and is significant for two reasons. First, as has
been indicated, modem conditions limit the time available to upgrade
readiness. Second, as was disclosed in Voyennaya Mysl' , the maintenance
of nuclear forces at constant readiness levels enables concealment of
military intentions by obviating the noticeable requirement of mobilizing
203
prior to initiating a strike. Strategic planning is another requisite
of military preparation. Two basic types of plans are considered neces-
sary. Those governing possible events in the near term (present to five
years hence) and those addressing long-term issues (10 to 15 years), are
to be maintained in an updated manner. These plans are to be based on
a "scientific prognostication in the area of international relations, on
the possibility of conflicts breaking out, and the development of the
economy, science, and technology.
Economic preparation supports the acquisition of modem weapons
systems, creates a reserve of military resources to enable conduct of
operations during periods when production may be impaired, and plans for
a return to economic solvency on conclusion of hostilities. While these
tasks are updated continuously, and are intended to be accomplished prior
to the outbreak of war, the Soviets also perceive a need for viable eco-
nomic production capabilities to function during the conduct of a nuclear
war. This requirement derives from the belief that although modern war
is likely to be of short duration, under certain conditions "it may be
dragged out and may require long and maximum effort of all forces of the
army and of the country as a whole.
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The most distinctive, and to some observers the most alarming, aspect
of Soviet preparation for war is that which is allocated the civilian
population. It is in this regard that the Soviets admit to the horrors
of a nuclear war. In commenting on the massive casualties and destruc-
tion associated with such a war, one author advises: "Even this very
incomplete picture of a future world war already obliges the political
and military leadership to prepare the people and the Armed Forces of this
country for unprecedented hardships and for unusually severe and destruc-
. . . ,.206
tive combat activities.
The psychological conditioning of the population is viewed as the
basic requirement of this preparation.
In case of nuclear warfare, the psychological preparation of
the populace will have an unusually great significance because
in case of outbreak of nuclear warfare, the entire populace of
the warring sides will-be plunged into the crucible immediately,
at the very beginning.
This conditioning is to be accomplished with the thorough indoc-
trination of Soviet citizens in the principles of "staunchness, courage,
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faith in victory, a sense of collectivism," etc. It is only with this
type of domestic solidarity and support that the Soviets feel capable of
successfully engaging in nuclear war.
Under modern conditions such preparation has its own specific
features and is carried out mainly on a moral-political, anti-
nuclear and military basis. The preparation of the population
from a moral-political and also from a psychological respect is
especially important in nuclear warfare in which the population
will be subjected to severe trials. These will be within the
capabilities of only such people as have a boundless love for
their country, possess high moral-political qualities, and are
prepared to undergo-any trials in order to achieve a victory
over an aggressor.
The Soviet belief in its obligation to realistically prepare for nu-
clear warfare reiterates acceptance of the "necessity of its prevention
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and the possibility of its being waged." Military readiness serves a
multitude of traditional objectives, and is thus not in itself alarming.
Calls for continuous economic preparations for war illustrate a degree
of paranoia which may be rationalized on the basis of historical expe-
rience and the conditions under which modem warfare is likely to unfold.
Advocacy of the psychological conditioning of the populace, however,
reveals a sincere commitment to the perception that nuclear war is in-
deed possible. These three issues combine to disclose the seriousness
with which the Soviet military regards the prospect of such conflict.
F. MILITARY SUPERIORITY
The quest for superiority of forces is a traditional and universal
military objective, as ancient as the art of warfare itself. Qualitative
and quantitative superiority in weapons and forces is viewed as essen-
tial to success in combat. This condition can be accomplished by either
of two methods. The most obvious is to maintain a level of forces which
exceeds that of one's opponent. The more difficult method involves the
creation, through economy of force moves, and concentration of rela-
tively superior forces pitted against an opponent at the decisive place
and time with the objective of defeating him piecemeal. The latter
approach finds more frequent expression in the annals of military his-
tory and can be applied to the full spectrum of military operations, from
tactical to strategic.
In the Soviet view, the issue of superiority of forces is so funda-
mental as to constitute the "first law of war".
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...The first law of war. . .states: the course and outcome of a war
waged with an unlimited employment of all means of conflict are
determined primarily by the correlation of strictly military forces
available to the combatants at the beginning of the war, especially
in nuclear weapons and means for their delivery.
This requirement for superiority is closely linked with the Soviet
interpretation of the need to prepare for war and with the economic capa-
bilities of the state. "A fundamental problem in the interrelationship
of military doctrine and the economy is the creation and maintenance
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of military-technical superiority over the probable enemy." Ascen-
dancy in weapons of mass destruction is viewed as the primary solution
to this problem. "Thus superiority in nuclear-rocket weapons is the
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decisive factor in military-technical superiority." Whereas in the
past, quantitative superiority over an opponent in war was viewed as
essential for success, the Soviets now maintain that the "revolution in
military affairs" has introduced the requirement for qualitative pre-
213
ponderance as well.
The perpetual quest for military superiority comprises one of the
basic responsibilities of the Soviet state. "Using the achievement of
Soviet economics, sciences, and technology, the party and state are doing
everything necessary to bring about our constant qualitative and quan-
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titative military and technical superiority..."
The criteria for calculating strategic nuclear superiority involves
consideration of relative throw weight capabilities, size of yield, and
numbers of weapons, and includes the degree of vulnerability of the
targeted country. The following assessment of the means to compute




The most prescient military leaders in the United States consider,
for example, that it is not only a question of the number of launching
sites for intercontinental missiles and missiles of other classes,
but also a question of the size of the payload which can be delivered
by these missiles to a target, the quantity of the missiles themselves,
and the degree of vulnerability of an enemy country.
Aside from the military desirability of superior strategic weapons,
a degree of political utility is believed to emerge from ascendancy in
nuclear weapons.
The achievement of superiority by the Soviet Union over the impe-
rialist aggressors in the might of nuclear ammunition and the possi-
bility of the inexorable and accurate delivery of them to the
designated target forced the military and political leadership
of the imperialist states to openly recognize the need to 'reassess
values .
'
Military superiority is thus viewed as a high priority objective
which will endow the ability to successfully engage in war, if it should
occur, and emerge victorious. It also releases the Soviet Union of the
historical burden imposed as a result of the strategically inferior
position she held vis-a-vis the U.S., and thus permits greater behavioral
flexibility.
G. PHASES OF MODERN WAR
Soviet military thought identifies three key phases of war, linked in
a progression, and terminating with the radical alteration of the pre-war
military-political situation. Knowledge of these phases, and the abi-
lity to determine the proper time of transition from one stage to the
next, are essential to victory in modem war. The first phase has been
designated the "threat period" and is defined as one of "...direct
preparation of a country and its armed forces for war, established by




The duration of this phase varies dependent upon the status of inter-
national relations, available means of combat, etc. In the Soviet view,
the period preceding World War I involved lengthy preparations and ex-
tended from 1912 to June, 1914. The threatening phase of World War II
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was considerably shorter, having commenced in March, 1938. This
phase is believed to originate as a result of a variety of events oc-
curring within the international arena to include, alterations in poli-
tical relations among states, outbreak of local hostilities, implementation
of civil defense procedures, increases in the level of military readiness,
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etc.
Two stages of the threat period have been identified. The first,
termed the "concealed stage," encompasses the period during which a
state implements secret preparations for war. The "open stage" begins
once these preparations are discovered, while the state is attempting
to complete readiness procedures. The duration of the open stage of
the threat period is dependent upon the type of warfare contemplated.
Longer periods are associated with conventional warfare. In nuclear
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war, the open stage is expected to be very short or non-existent.
A variety of diplomatic, economic, political, and military indi-
cators, each with varying degrees of subtlety, will become apparent
to the alert observer to reveal the beginning of the threat period.
Failure to detect this phase and react accordingly can have devastating
consequences, especially in the event nuclear weapons are involved.
In order not to be caught by surprise and to make it possible
to put into operation in an organized and timely manner the forces
and means, operational and prudent leadership of the Armed Forces
is especially required during the duration of the threatening period.
A very deep evaluation of the developing situation and immediate
reactions to measures and operations of the enemy will be necessary.
The main thing here is not to be late or to exclude surprise and not
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to give the enemy^auy advantage in developing the readiness of
his armed forces.
The significance of the accurate determination of the various stages
of the period of threat cannot be overemphasized. This determination is
closely related to the Soviet objective of frustrating an enemy attack.
Soviet military writing is replete with the desirability, indeed the
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absolute necessity, of thwarting an attack. The only means of accom-
plishing this is to ascertain enemy intentions during the threat period,
and deliver a nuclear strike to frustrate those intentions . "A most
important task of the military leadership is prompt determination of the
onset of this (threat) period and the taking of immediate effective steps
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to repulse a surprise enemy attack."
Such doctrinal thought lends credence to the following strategic
scenario. During the course of an international crisis situation, where
tensions mount and cloud perceptions, a state inadvertently signals the
onset of a period of threat. This signal is received and interpreted as
evidence of impending strategic attack, and thus calls for execution of
a preemptive strike.
The second period of modern warfare distinguished by Soviet strate-
gists consists of its initial phases. Seizure of the strategic initia-
tive is viewed as the decisive requirement of this period. War can
commence as a result of the escalation of localized conflict or through
direct employment of strategic nuclear forces. Implementation of the
latter approach is viewed as a most effective means of acquiring the
strategic initiative. "The most probable way of unleashing a world
war, as they write about it in foreign countries, may be a sudden attack




in the interior of the country." Having acknowledged the most pro-
bable means of beginning a world war, the Soviets relate the early sei-
zure of strategic initiative with the accomplishment of strategic objec-
tives.
The most important moment, ensuring the successful conduct of a
war, and rendering a decisive influence on the possibility of the
timely augmentation of efforts, is seizing and maintaining the stra-
tegic initiative from the very beginning of the war. . .Now, when
armies are armed with weapons with unprecedented destructive capa-
bilities, possession of the strategic initiative can under certain
conditions even predetermine the outcome of the war as a whole.
The surprise use of nuclear weapons is recognized as an expedient
approach to acquisition of this initiative. Failure to accomplish this
at the onset of conflict may well lead to defeat. In World War II, it
took the Soviets one and one-half years to wrest the initiative from
Germany. The contemporary nature of modem warfare will not allow the
luxury of time in which the Soviet Union can seize the initiative from
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an opponent. "From the nature of modern war it follows that the use
of nuclear-rocket weapons as a decisive means of armed conflict makes it
possible to achieve immediate strategic goals in a short time in a be-
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ginning period of the war."
The final phase of war, in Soviet thought, is that which transpires
subsequent to the initial period. Its existence and duration will in
large measure be determined by the actions of the initial period. Vic-
tory in the beginning phase of war is viewed as a distinct possibility,
if its conduct is managed properly.
Mass nuclear missile strikes at the armed forces of the opponent
and at his key economic and political objectives can determine
the victory of one side and the defeat of the other at the very
beginning of the war. Therefore, a correct estimate of the elements
of the supremacy over the opponent and the ability to use them „^q
before the opponent does, are the key to victory in such a war.
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Under certain conditions, war can develop into a protracted conflict,
even after mass exchanges of nuclear weapons. This possibility necessi-
tates the readiness of conventional forces to conclude hostilities
during the subsequent period of war.
At the present time, no one can deny the possibility of a short
lived war. . .However, it is quite obvious that depending on con-
ditions of origin of the war, armed struggle to the finish will
not be limited only to attacks with nuclear weapons. It-may be
dragged out and may require long and maximum effort...
H. THE ELEMENT OF SURPRISE
Passing reference has already been made to the Soviet concern with
the element of surprise. This concern is of such magnitude as to war-
rant detailed examination of its treatment in military writings. The
Soviets are indeed obsessed with the military implications of the sur-
prise factor. As a universal and traditional principle of warfare,
surprise plays a key role in any military operation, whether it be tacti-
cal or strategic. In the case of the Soviet Union, surprise assumes an
even greater significance, owing in part to the xenophobic nature of its
society, its historical experience, and its own perception of the nature
and conduct of modern warfare. Soviet interest in this phenomenon
develops from two basic needs. First, above all, they do not wish to
be the recipient of surprise. Second, recognizing its decisiveness as
a military means to strategic ends, they seek to be the purveyors of
surprise.
The Soviets define surprise as a key principle of military art which
will insure success in warfare. Surprise may be applied at the tactical,
operational, or strategic echelon of military operations, and
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...makes it possible to inflict heavy losses upon the enemy in
short periods of time. . .Surprise is achieved in the following
ways: by using various types and methods of combat; by mis-
leading the enemy as to one's own intentions; by safeguarding
the security of operational plans; by decisive action and
skillful maneuver; by unexpected use of nuclear weapons ; and„by
using means and methods with which the enemy is unfamiliar.
The goal of surprise military actions is to "dumbfound the enemy and
catch him unawares when he is least prepared to parry an unexpected
attack," and thus render total defeat with the minimal expenditure of
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friendly forces.
The increased significance of the surprise factor is viewed as a
consequence of three basic characteristics of modem warfare. First,
the temporal aspect of a future war raises its importance. "While
several weeks or months were required in the past... for unleashing of
a world war, in modem conditions, only minutes are needed to inflict
232
a nuclear strike against the enemy." Second, the devastation
associated with weapons of mass destruction radically increases the
consequences of surprising or being surprised. "In view of the immense
destructive force of nuclear weapons. . .the launching of the first
massed nuclear attack acquires decisive importance for achieving the
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objectives of war." Finally, skillful employment of surprise can
do much to offset the advantage enjoyed as a result of superiority in
military forces. Surprise is "a more important condition for achieving
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victory than overall superiority." Thus, these three conditions
have elevated the primacy of the surprise factor to the level at which
"preemption in launching a nuclear strike is considered to be the
decisive condition for the attainment of superiority over him (the
2 3 S
enemy) and the seizure and retention of the initiative."
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The first requirement which develops as a result of the influence
of the surprise factor is never to allow oneself to be caught unawares.
This is to be accomplished through a combination of procedures. The
extensive reliance on intelligence is viewed as one means of preventing
surprise. All intelligence assets are to be integrated in a common
effort designed to disclose strategic enemy intentions. The poli-
tical and military leadership are to be alert and responsive to situa-
tional events to preclude surprise.
...in a nuclear missile war an erroneous decision by political
and military leaders and the inability to foresee the course
of events are fraught with irreversible consequences. This is
why under present-day conditions the role of foresight has
become much greater...
A high degree of combat readiness is viewed as another method of redu-
cing the impact of surprise. Brezhnev summarized the Soviet reso-
lution on this issue by observing that "we are taking into consideration
the lessons of the past and are doing everything so that nobody catches
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us by surprise."
The second task originating from the significance of surprise in
modem warfare is to employ it to maximum Soviet advantage. The first
condition for successful employment of this technique is detailed plan-
ning. "This means it is possible to count on the success of surprise
actions only on condition of their prior planning, preparation, and
240
timely implementation." Uniqueness of approach is another consi-
deration in effective surprise. Inventive and bizarre techniques pro-
duce greater deception and are therefore more successful.
Surprise is incompatible with stereotype. Stereotype contra-
dicts the very essence of surprise. If one has succeeded in
deceiving the enemy once, then he will not allow himself to be
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deceived a second time by the very same technique. Therefore,
there is a continuous search for newer techniques and methods
for achieving surprise.
In a surprise attack, maximum use of available strategic weapons sys-
tems should be made to increase the level of shock effect and to accom-
plish the greatest amount of devastation. A combination of ICBM's,
SLBM's, strategic bombers, and space weapons integrated into a combined
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strike is viewed as the best means of satisfying this requirement.
The maintenance of strategic nuclear forces in constant readiness
for a strike enables delivery of an attack without implementation of
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mobilization measures which would disclose strategic intentions.
Another requisite of surprise involves the blinding of enemy intel-
ligence collection means on the eve of war. This is to be accomplished
simultaneously with the increase in the friendly means of intelligence
collection and reconnaissance.
...take active measures to suppress and blind reconnaissance
forces and means of the enemy by creating strong interference
against radio and radio technical means. For this purpose, high
altitude nuclear explosions can be carried out in the beginning
and in the course of the war to destroy the system of control
and communications and to suppress the anti-missile and antir
air defense radar system and the aircraft control systems.
Deception is viewed as a key requirement of surprise and can be
practiced in a variety of ways with the objective of using "...such
methods of operations which do not produce the end result in complete
form, but insure a high level of probability of achievement of sur-
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prise." The use of training maneuvers to cover deplojmient of forces
or the fostering of localized wars to conceal creation of a crisis atmo-
sphere to justify escalation to strategic nuclear strikes are both
246
recognized means of deception in support of surprise. One interesting
technique discussed in the pages of Voyennaya Mysl'
, albeit in the
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context of an aggressor's use of the technique, involves the induced
relaxation of international tensions preparatory to initiation of a
surprise strategic attack. Thus a temporary relaxation of tension could
be used to produce an illusionary thermidor which might yield a substan-
tial advantage in the employment of surprise.
It must be noted, however, that an aggravation of the inter-
national situation by aggressive imperialist circles on the
eve of the war is not obligatory. On the contrary, for the
purpose of disinformation and deceiving public opinion, they
might resort to a false softening of relations 4g4, under
cover of this maneuver, suddenly unleash a war.
Recognizing the impossibility of avoiding some retaliatory damage,
even with skillful preemption, the Soviets feel it is necessary to
implement damage limitation procedures prior to initiation of even a
surprise attack. "Everybody knows that in modern conflict of comba-
tants which are relatively equal in power (in number and especially in
quality of weapons) , an immediate retaliatory strike of immense destruc-
tive power is inevitable." It is therefore necessary to take measures
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to reduce one's vulnerability before launching the attack.
Knowledge and employment of the element of surprise is, therefore,
a key strategic principle in Soviet military thought. In military
writings there is seldom a distinction drawn between the concepts of
surprise, preemption, preventive attack, and the need to frustrate or
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thwart an enemy's attack on the Soviet Union. All relate to the
necessity of avoiding the possibility of being surprised by employing
this technique in an early and decisive manner. In this context, one
should recall the importance allocated in Soviet military thought to




The subject of strategic targeting in a nuclear age is one which
has received extensive analysis in both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. In
Western thought, this analysis has resulted in the identification of two
basic categories of targets: countervalue and counterforce. The former
consist of value oriented aspects of society, and as such have little
military utility. The latter designation concerns an opponent's mili-
tary means of waging war, especially strategic means. The U.S. doctrine
of deterrence is based primarily on countervalue targeting, and places
emphasis on the ability to inflict an unacceptable level of damage on
the Soviet civilian population and industry. Other aspects of U.S.
doctrine provide some flexibility with which certain counterforce
targets can be attacked, as necessary, but the ultimate thrust of U.S.
strategic policy is directed toward countervalue targets. The U.S.
approach is thus dependent on U.S. military doctrine, which holds as
a fundamental premise that the threat of employment of weapons of mass
destruction coupled with visions of the resulting devastation, will
function to deter their use.
The Soviet analysis of targeting is also directed by their mili-
tary doctrine which, as noted, consists of a realistic military stra-
tegy, not a theoretical calculation of how to prevent war. The Soviet
approach to targeting represents a counterforce orientation. This,
however, is quite different from the Western understanding of what
constitutes a counterforce target. The U.S. view, for example, holds
that such entities as ICBM launchers, SLBM bases and submarines, long-
range bombers and their bases, command and control facilities, and
military forces constitute counterforce targets. The Soviet version
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includes these military targets, but also encompasses entities which in
the West have been associated with the countervalue designation. The
rationale behind this "expanded" approach refers to the Soviet under-
standing of the essence of war and the nature of strategic objectives.
The strategic goal of any military operation, be it tactical or stra-
tegic, conventional or nuclear, is the total destruction of the enemy's
current and potential ability to wage war. In the Soviet view, the
capacity to wage war develops not only from accumulated military forces,
but also from the means of political control of a state, the economic
capabilities, and above all, from the will of the population to engage
in modern war.
In a future war with the use of nuclear-missile weapons, the strikes
will be inflicted simultaneously on both the armed forces and against
administrative-political and military-industrial centers of the
country, the destruction of which will disorganize state and military
control, undermine the military-economic potential, deprive the
enemy of the opportunity to conduct extended combat operations,
and lead to his destruction. . .The entire territory of the comba-
tant countries is drawn into the sphere of^armed conflict regard-
less of their sizes and location on earth.
Another Voyennaya Mysl
'
article commented on the multifarious
nature of Soviet targeting by maintaining that the "power of nuclear
weapons will be concentrated above all toward destruction of the mili-
tary-economic potential, defeat of the groupings of armed forces, and
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undermining the morale of the population." Soviet strategic doc-
trine thus calls for the destruction of the enemy's actual and
potential ability to offer resistance and as a result takes on greater
significance than the mere targeting of military forces.
Strategic nuclear weapons are assigned the primary role in Soviet
targeting. The capabilities of these weapons enable the simultaneous
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destruction of military forces and other elements relating to the abi-
lity to wage war without regard to location. It should be recalled that
one feature of the revolution in military affairs which influences Soviet
thinking is the elimination of a distinction between the front and the
rear.
The emergence of nuclear missiles has revealed the material basis
of the principle of simultaneous destruction of the enemy through-
out the entire depth of his combat and operational deployment as
well as the destruction of the most important militarv-economic
targets deep in the rear of the belligerent states.
The Soviets utilize a set of fundamental principles in selecting
strategic targets. First is the degree of risk the target affords the
attacker. High threat targets are to be identified and assigned prio-
rity for servicing.
...the indicated objectives should be examined and classified by
the degree of their danger for the attacker. Thus, the launch
position from which 10 minutes ago a strategic rocket was launched,
does not represent a threat in the immediate period of time, since
the firing of another missile requires a certain period of time.
An airfield of strategic aircraft with bombers which have just
landed is... less dangerous than a similar airf ield^vith aircraft
ready to take off which are carrying nuclear arms.
The second basic tenet concerns the vulnerability of a target and
addresses the maximum utilization of available weapons systems. The
economical employment of nuclear weapons against targets best suited
for their use is a necessary planning condition.
Objectives of a deep attack can vary also in the degree of vul-
nerability. For example, airfields, formations of reserves...
other stationary objects and also junctions of roads and various
industrial plants are easily vulnerable. . .control posts in hard
shelters, and submarines and surface ships at sea are not vul-
nerable objectives.
An additional consideration in selecting targets is the necessity of
coordinating the entire targeting effort with the objective of attaining
the most favorable balance of forces once the attack has been accomplished.
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The most important factor influencing the correlation of forces
is the optimal distribution of nuclear means in terms of enemy
targets. It should be acknowledged that the best variant of a
nuclear strike is the one which insures the greatest correlation
of forces in our favor after the strike is delivered.
Other factors involved in target calculations include the quantity of
weapons available, the size of yield, vulnerability to defensive mea-
sures at time of launch, during flight, and at arrival on target, and
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the total plan of the strategic operation.
These principles have led to classification by precedence of targets
selected for strategic strikes. The first priority is the strategic
nuclear forces of the enemy, and include ICBM's, SLBM's, strategic air
bases, strategic navy bases, nuclear stores, and related command and
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control facilities. In essence, targets of the highest priority con-
sist of those defined as counterforce in Western doctrine.
A delay in destruction of (the enemy's) means of nuclear attack
will permit the enemy to launch the nuclear strikes first and
may lead to heavy losses and even to defeat of the offensive.
The 'accximulation' of such targets as nuclear weapons and
waiting with the intention of -destroying them subsequently is
now absolutely inadmissible.
The second priority is allocated theater level aviation and nuclear
forces, to include their reserves and related control facilities. This
is followed by attacks on military ground forces, reserves, and logis-
tical support elements. A fourth priority is assigned an enemy's air
defense capabilities. The final grouping includes important military-
industrial objectives, administrative and political centers, transpor-
tation systems, ports, and centers of state administration. This
sequence of targeting is offered only as a guide, and may be altered
259dependent upon situational events. For example, strategic forces and
economic and political centers may require simultaneous targeting to
produce the desired results.
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As has been noted, the servicing of economic targets is considered
an important strategic objective which will facilitate the enemy's total
destruction. Only those industrial facilities which can support a war
effort are included in this category.
The growing significance of the economic factor on the course and
outcome of a possible world war have resulted in the fact that the
atomic, rocket, aviation, tank, and artillery plants, and all
radioelectronics, chemical, metallurgical, machine building, and
electric power enterprises have become strategic targets, which
at the very beginning of military operations will be subjected to
nuclear strikes.
The massive destruction of civilian economic centers, viewed as a
necessary element of countervalue strikes in the West, finds no expres-
sion in Soviet strategy. Such an approach would result in the unneces-
sary expenditure of strategic weapons. The Soviets are concerned only
with those economic assets which contribute to the enemy's ability to
wage war. Moreover, they perceive the possibility of employing enemy
economic capabilities in support of their war effort and as an aid to
recovery on conclusion of hostilities.
The objective is not to turn the large economic and industrial
regions into a heap of ruins (although great destruction appa-
rently is unavoidable) , but to deliver strikes which will
destroy strategic combat means, paralyze enemy military pro-
duction, making it incapable of satisfying the priority needs
of the front and rear areas, and sharply reduce the enemy capa-
bility to conduct strikes.
Intricate planning is considered essential in target selection and
makes extensive use of available intelligence and reconnaissance means
prior to the outbreak of war. "Before the beginning of military opera-
tions, the main task of air and space intelligence is to. . .ascertain
the priority enemy targets which must be subjected to nuclear at-
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tacks." Surveillance is to be continued during the course of
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operations to reconfirm target locations, evaluate the effectiveness of
previous strikes, and "to avoid inflicting an attack on an empty
,,263
place.
The Soviet approach to strategic targeting represents a thorough
analysis of the requirements necessary for the total military defeat
of the enemy. It does not target the civilian population. To do so,
in the Soviet view, would be counterproductive, and would result in a
bolstering of the will to resist. Attacking the enemy's civilian popu-
lation is of no military importance. Failure of the allied air offen-
sive against Germany in World War II to demoralize the German people
and produce an early conclusion of the hostilities, is frequently cited
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as evidence of the futility of targeting an opponent's population.
A more recent example can be found in the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam
which served to enhance North Vietnamese morale.
J. ESCALATION
An interesting distinction between Soviet and American doctrinal
thought concerns the understanding of the "theory of escalation." This
theory plays an integral role in U.S. strategic doctrine. It serves to
link the application of selected military options in a theoretical
progression through a series of thresholds which may terminate with the
mass use of strategic nuclear forces employed in an assured destruction
role. The theory holds that the level of conflict can be limited to
thresholds below the "ultimate" use of nuclear weapons. For example,
U.S. doctrine maintains that it is possible to escalate to use of tacti-
cal nuclear weapons on the battlefield without risking immediate esca-
lation to higher thresholds. Several conditions are necessary for the
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operation of this theory. Each opponent must possess similar weapons
systems, each must have comparable targets, and each must recognize
the existence of different degrees of conflict, i.e., thresholds.
The Soviet view of escalation radically departs from the U.S. per-
ception on the latter condition. They maintain that any resort to
use of nuclear weapons will inevitably lead to escalation to strategic
use of such weapons. Adherence to this interpretation may be moti-
vated by two considerations. First, it reflects the Soviet belief that
war is driven by objective laws which operate independent of man's
volition. Second, the decisiveness of a future world war would
dictate the employment of any means necessary to secure victory.
In the modern era, the danger of a local war erupting into a deci-
sive world war is one view of escalation held by the Soviets. "The
danger of nuclear war is now connected. . .also with the possibility
that a local conflict will develop into a world war." Another
comment on the danger of conflict mushrooming indicates that "Soviet
military science considers that such wars (local, limited, liberation)
may escalate into a world nuclear war, particularly in those conditions
where the imperialists employ 'tactical' atomic weapons. In this event
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they will provoke a crushing answering nuclear rocket strike."
Soviet military thought holds that nuclear weapons, regardless of
size, are weapons of mass destruction. Once these weapons have been
introduced, irrespective of the method or scale of the strike, the
level of conflict will inevitably escalate to wider use of other wea-
pons of mass destruction.
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The conception of 'limited' use of nuclear weapons con-
stitutes deception of the people's masses... A nuclear fire
which has begun cannot be localized by anybody. It will
envelop without fail the entire world, and capitalism as
a socio-economic structure will perish once and for all in
its fire.
Soviet military writings frequently analyze and comment on American
interpretations of escalation theory. The consistent conclusion main-
tains that a belief in the limitation of the means of conflict in a
world war is an abstract departure from reality, which lacks any
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military sensibility. The Soviets observe that the principles of
escalation espoused in U.S. doctrine
...are based on one rather disputable position, i.e., that in
the course of any controllable war there may be achieved a cer-
tain tacit agreement between the combatants as to possible
courses of action, aims which can be pursued, weapons which can
be used, and even methods of armed conflict. With the existence
of multi-megaton nuclear and thermonuclear weapons and perfected
means of delivering them to targets, along with the state of
extreme nervous tension during modern armed conflict, especially
conflict between nuclear powers, such a 'return to the knightly
tournament' is either a fantasy, or an attempt to mask the true
state of affairs.
K. VICTORY
The notion of victory in modern warfare finds frequent expression
in Soviet military writings. That they place credence in the possi-
bility of its accomplishment in a world war is attested to by the
application of serious military procedures to plan and prepare for its
conduct. Any admission that victory could not be secured in a nuclear
war would undermine the basic foundation of Soviet military doctrine.
The a priori objective of any military operation is to inflict defeat
upon the enemy and thus emerge as the victor. The essence of Soviet
doctrine is simply the strategy of war and thus necessitates advocacy
of the principle of victory. Soviet military thought maintains that
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there "is profound error and harm in the disorienting claims of bour-
geois ideologues that there will be no victor in a thermonuclear world
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war.
Significant attention is paid the inevitability of Soviet victory in
a world war. True to fashion, Marxist-Leninist ideology is used to pro-
vide plausible explanation and justification. The philosophical tenet
of the ultimate triumph of socialism over capitalistic imperialism is
frequently rolled out to buttress the predestined nature of Soviet vic-
tory.
Soviet military doctrine defines the character of modern war as
the decisive armed conflict of two opposing social systems. If
such a war is unleashed, then with all its destructive force, it
will end in the destruction of imperialism, since there are all
the necessary economic, political, moral, and military prerequi-
sites for this. 'The monopolistic bourgeoisie' the CPSU program
states, 'cannot defend itself from the unalterable^course of
historical development, even by nuclear weapons.'
The costs of achieving victory in a world war are recognized as
being exorbitant, but this differs little from the content of the Rus-
sian historical experience. In commenting on the massive destruction
associated with nuclear conflict, one officer advised: "We have no
doubt of its outcome: capitalism will be buried, but at what a
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pricel" Another author cautioned his readers:
We must always remember that, if a world nuclear missile war is
unleashed by the imperialists, hundreds of millions of people will
be dragged into its orbit. Victory in such a war will be attained
not only by the operations of massive armed forces, but also by the
vigorous activities of the people as a whole.
Soviet military thought embraces the notion of victory in nuclear
warfare. To an extent, this belief is dictated by their doctrine. It
also develops from the basic objective of any military operation. The
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essential question in the Soviet mind is not "can one win?", but "how
does one win?" That the nature of victory may be entirely pyrrhic
is of little import.
L. DAMAGE LIMITATION
As is evidenced by the offensive nature of Soviet doctrine analyzed
thus far, the limitation of the level of damage inflicted on the Soviet
Union is viewed as a necessary requirement. Damage limitation, as a
strategic concept, defines any attempt to curtail damage inflicted by an
opponent through employment of options designed to reduce the effective-
ness of his forces. This can be achieved by offensive measures designed
to destroy the opponent's, capability to inflict damage, by defensive
measures employed to deny him access to his objectives, or by passive
measures designed to limit the effects of his attack. Measures reducing
the vulnerability of one's strategic military forces, population, and
industry achieve defensive damage limitation, while measures exploiting
the vulnerability of an opponent's military forces are offensive mea-
sures to limit damage.
The Soviet view of war, of the requirement for its preparation, of
the strategic importance of the element of surprise, and of targeting
the enemy's ability to inflict damage—all serve to satisfy the con-
ditions of offensive damage limitation. The needs of adequate defen-
sive measures to reduce vulnerability are met first by combining both
offensive and defensive techniques.
It is entirely obvious that by striking at the strategic nuclear
attack facilities of the enemy, they (nuclear missiles) carry out
an exceptionally important assignment of a defensive nature, deci-
sively weakening the power of the nuclear enemy strike and creating




The Soviets feel that active defensive tasks, i.e., destruction of
incoming strategic weapons, can be more easily accomplished if the
volume of enemy weapons can be reduced prior to launch. The effective-
ness of those which are launched will be curtailed by air defense
forces.
Although Soviet doctrine is based on the primacy of the offensive,
defensive requirements are understood to have assumed greater impor-
tance as a result of the revolution in military affairs. "It should be
said that defense against enemy nuclear strikes is, undoubtedly, of
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major strategic significance." Passive measures are also considered
necessary. The possibility of a retaliatory strike of some magnitude
being visited on Soviet Russia becomes inevitable once war begins.
This means that measures to reduce vulnerability must be implemented
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before launching an attack.
Obviously there will be a mass evacuation of the population from
densely populated cities, major industrial and administrative
centers. It will begin at the moment a threat arises, when it
becomes obvious^to the political leaders that war is unlikely
to be avoided.
Energetic civil defense procedures, coupled with the geographic advan-
tage enjoyed by the U.S.S.R., facilitate vulnerability reduction.
In a nuclear missile war, countries with extensive territory will
turn out to be in the most favorable situation. They will be able
to distribute their population, industry and armed forces in the
proper manner, to have a deeply echeloned air defense, to disperse
strategic weapons and to maneuver reserves. Such prospects are
enjoyed primarily by the Soviet Union.
In summary, the strategic nuclear doctrine of the Soviet Union lacks
abstract theoretical foundation, and relies instead on the application
of military procedures as a solution to military problems. A future
world war is viewed as the ultimate manifestation of conflict between
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opposing class systems caused not by a dispute over the issues which
have historically lead to war, but by the decisive clash of vital
interests which will culminate with the total destruction of one of the
protagonists. Its totality dictates that all means be taken to avoid
its outbreak, but in the event these should fail, one must be ready to
wage war with the objective of realizing the rapid and total defeat of
the opponent. From the latter requirement emerges the substance of
Soviet nuclear strategy, which consists of a series of conditions and
techniques that will enable victory in such decisive conflict. Prere-
quisites include the thorough preparation of the military, economic,
and civilian elements of Soviet society; and the accumulation of quan-
titative and qualitative superiority in the tools of warfare. Knowledge
of the objective laws of war and the ability to manipulate conditions
under which they unfold will yield significant advantage. It is essen-
tial to foresee the onset of the period of threat preceding hostilities
and to take measures during its initial stage to seize and maintain the
strategic initiative. The skillful application of the element of sur-
prise in conjunction with the early and decisive use of weapons of mass
destruction will serve this objective. Striking the entire spectrum of
targets which contribute to the enemy's ability to wage war is the only
feasible means of securing his defeat. To limit the amount of damage
received, and thereby facilitate post-war recovery, it is essential to
maintain and implement procedures which reduce vulnerability prior to
initiation of the strategic offensive. Only under these conditions can
victory be realized in a future world war.
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A brief comparison of American and Soviet strategic doctrine may
serve to further clarify the essential nature of the latter. Figure
seven identifies key contrasts between the two. American strategic
doctrine operates in the belief that nuclear war can be avoided by the
mere threat of its outbreak. It maintains that international stability
results from an essential equivalence in the balance of strategic capa-
bilities among superpowers. Should this stability deteriorate, for
whatever reason, U.S. doctrine offers limited strategic alternatives,
all of which culminate with massive blind use of nuclear weapons. In
the event deterrence fails, doctrine calls for implementation of a
relatively shortsighted and brief sequence of strategic events at the
outset of war. At this point, doctrine ceases to function. It is not
concerned with what occurs once a world war begins.
In contrast, Soviet strategic doctrine begins to take form and offer
realistic guidance at precisely this point. It is fundamentally con-
cerned with what transpires should stability deteriorate into open
warfare. The militaristic nature of Soviet doctrine not only offers a
means of coping with such an eventuality, but also functions to deter
the possibility of its occurrence. The latter condition follows from
the premise that the best means of maintaining security in a nuclear
age is to be able to fight and win a nuclear war.
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UNITED STATES SOVIET UNION
1. Nuclear War Unthinkable.
2. Strategic thought shaped by
civilian elite.
3. Underlying doctrinal
principle is mutual deterrence
through assured destruction.
4. Strategic forces maintained
at levels believed sufficient
to deter war.
1. Nuclear war must be avoided but
-may occur.
2. Strategic thought shaped by
military elite.
3. Underlying doctrinal principle
is war fighting - damage
limiting concept.
4. Strategic forces developed to
levels necessary to wage war.
5. Second strike orientation.
6. High alert rate on all
strategic forces.
7. Ultimately targets civilian
population and industry.
5. First strike orientation.
6. Low alert rate on mobile
strategic forces.
7. Targets military capability.
8. Accepts vulnerability.
9. Rejects notion of victory
in nuclear war.
8. Eschews vulnerability.
9. Proceeds from belief that vic-
tory in nuclear war is possi-
ble.




It should now be possible to return to the fundamental issues briefly
outlined in the introduction as underlying the debate on the capabilities
and intentions of the Soviet Union. Are the interests of the Soviet
Union sufficiently convergent with those of the United States as to con-
stitute a foundation upon which greater stability can be built? To
what end are developments in the strategic forces of the Soviet Union
directed? What does Soviet thinking on nuclear war portend for inter-
national security and the endurance of peace? From the U.S. perspec-
tive, the initial response to each of these questions is not overly
optimistic.
On the issue of commonality, one may conclude that while the generic
interests and objectives valued by the Soviet Union are in large measure
coincident with those of the United States, the means of attaining those
objectives are dissimilar. The existence of common interests in sur-
vival, prosperity, prestige, etc. , cannot be disputed. The divergence,
however, stems from a lack of "shared interest" in mutual cooperation
toward simultaneous achievement of these goals. The Soviets view their
relationship with others as a zero-sum game, played not in the spirit
of cooperation, but with a competitive zeal designed to further Soviet
interests at the expense of the opposition. This contestant mentality
derives from the conditioning influences of the Soviet/Russian expe-
rience.
The importance of recognizing the fact that the Soviet perception
of the world differs fundamentally from that of the United States cannot
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be exaggerated. These contrasting perspectives result in different
behavioral approaches to the resolution of common problems. This diver-
gence is frequently interpreted as evidence of overt antagonism and
hostility, and thus serves to heighten mistrust and fear of Soviet mo-
tives. Failure to take notice of the dissimilarity of perceptions, and
to apply it in evaluating Soviet behavior is to discount the possibility
of understanding and influencing that behavior. Consider, for example,
the analyst who witnesses a major buildup in Soviet strategic forces,
and interprets that behavior in terms of his own "deterrent oriented"
understanding of strategic matters. He cannot rationalize growth in
Soviet forces because in his assessment, the pre-growth level of forces
was adequate to cope with what he felt strategic forces should do —
deter war. Lacking a comprehension of Soviet perceptions or of the
motives which necessitated such a buildup, the analyst will probably
select an "action-reaction" pattern to explain increases in Soviet
strategic power. He might then recommend unilateral restraint in the
expectation that such behavior would be emulated, or he might counsel
for negotiated limitation to moderate growth. In each case, however,
the recommendation speaks to the symptoms of the problem, not its
cause. The sources of Soviet conduct lie much deeper and are much more
complex than that which can be rationalized by "action-reaction". Each
of the three approaches enumerated will be ineffectual in altering the
determinates which condition Soviet behavior. At best, some combination
of these may influence the means with which these determinants are given
expression. In each case the analyst has failed to consider the influ-
ence of the Soviet experience on the exercise of Soviet policy. He has
placed a reflective screen between himself and the problem, and is thus
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unable to understand Soviet behavior. If he can withdraw that screen
by accepting the proposition that Soviet activity is driven by a set of
influences which are fundamentally alien to his experience, he will be
in a better position to contend with it.
Some of the factors in this not-so-hypothetical example include a
penchant for confronting situations perceived as threatening with a
military response; a rejection of any reliance on a cooperative under-
standing as a fundamental means of preserving security; a historic
desire to escape the stigma of inferiority and demonstrate preeminence
of the Soviet style; etc. These are but a few of the factors which
condition the Soviet approach to achieving the interests and objectives
which on the surface, may appear common to both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R,
Review of a few examples might serve to clarify the distinction be-
tween approaches to strategic issues. The Soviet position on the sub-
ject of verification in SALT is one which has long puzzled some U.S.
observers. If an agreement limiting strategic weapons can be reached,
they ask, what possible objection could be made to mutual on-site inspec-
tion to verify compliance? The Soviet rejection of on-site inspection
must be viewed in light of an addiction to secrecy which again reflects
differing perceptions conditioned by differing influences. The Soviet
Union has always demonstrated extreme sensitivity about revealing
matters connected in any way with its military capabilities. The issue
of encrypted telemetry further illustrates this point. Under provisions
of SALT I, both signatories agreed that neither would interfere with the
other's "National Technical Means" of verification. The U.S. was
alarmed when it became evident that the Soviet Union was concealing,
through encryption, telemetry data associated with testing of the SS-18
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ICBM. Following protests, it was announced that a joint agreement had
been reached which stipulated that the Soviet Union would not encode
missile test data that would preclude U.S. verification of SALT. The
implication is obvious. The Soviets will continue to encrypt data which
in their estimation does not relate to verification.
This commitment to secrecy, a trait clearly evident in the Soviet
experience, functions to impede development of an attitude of mutual
cooperation and trust. The question then becomes one of intent — is
this obsession with the taciturn merely a reflection of the Soviet style,
or does it conceal a deception designed to secure Soviet advantage?
The answer is also to be found in the Soviet experience. Cooperation
which restricts the unilateral furtherance of Soviet interests is viewed
as an undesirable tactic. Any means of enhancing the Soviet position,
consistent with prudent risk, - gain calculations, are perceived as
viable and legitimate, regardless of the circumstances under which they
are practiced.
Another example of divergent interests and approaches unfolding in
the context of SALT involves the story of the "heavy missile" contro-
versy. Article II of the SALT I Interim Agreement binds each party
not to convert land based launchers for "light" or pre-1964 ICBM's into
launchers for "heavy" newer ICBM's. This presented an obstacle to
Soviet deployment of a new missile which was then nearing the testing
phase of its development. The obvious solution, for Soviet negotia-
tors, was not to reach agreement on the definition of a "heavy" missile.
Finally, in desparation, the U.S. issued the following unilateral state-
ment concurrent with the signing of the treaty.
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The U.S. delegation regrets that the Soviet delegation has not
been willing to agree on a common definition of a heavy missile.
Under these circumstances, the U.S. delegation believes it neces-
sary to state the following: The United States would consider
any ICBM having a volume significantly greater than the largest
light ICBM now operational on either side to be a heavy ICBM.
The U.S. proceeds on the premise that the Soviet side will give
due account to this consideration.
In April 1973 the Soviet Union began testing, and later deployed the
SS-19 — a weapon some 40 percent larger in volume than the largest
"light" ICBM operational in May 1972. While this is clearly in vio-
lation of the U.S. definition of a "heavy" missile, it is important
to note that it does not represent a violation of the letter of the
treaty. No concensus was reached on the definition of "heavy", and
therefore the Soviet Union could deploy larger systems without risking
U.S. protest. The U.S., however, was disturbed by what it believed was
a violation of the spirit of the agreement. It should become apparent
that the Soviet Union is not as concerned with the spiritual implica-
tions of an accord. This, and related examples, suggests that the
Soviets do not acknowledge a fundamental inconsistence between pursuit
of the SALT process and pursuit of unilateral strategic advantage. The
latter objective appears to predominate in the formulation of Soviet
policy.
Returning now to the central question, one may conclude that the
interests of the Soviet Union, and the means selected in pursuit of
those interests, are conditioned by an experience peculiar to Soviet
Russia. Mr. Warnke's assertion that both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.
share a common interest in survival is correct. The lack, however,
of a common (shared) experience upon which mutual cooperation can be
built complicates accommodation. Additionally, each system pursues
117

goals which are in themselves incompatible. The United States, a status-
quo power, seeks to preserve the current situation which is by and large
favorable to its interests. The Soviet Union, a revolutionary entity,
strives to alter the existing balance to achieve a more favorable posi-
tion. It is within these parameters that events unfold.
As to the second fundamental issue, one may surmise that developments
in the strategic nuclear forces of the Soviet Union are designed to se-
cure a position of dominance from which Soviet influence can be exercised
with relative impunity. This thrust beyond the bounds of parity is
driven by two basic considerations. The first is closely related to the
Soviet perception as formed by historical experience, and involves es-
caping the onus of strategic subordination. A related motive is the
desirability of turning the tables, as it were, and occupying a posi-
tion from which opponent behavior can be commanded. The second impetus
for strategic dominance is a mere military consideration evolving out
of Soviet doctrine.
Historically, the Soviet Union has suffered from an inability to
match the accomplishments of the West in most fields of endeavor.
Soviet Russia has consistently demonstrated comparative weaknesses in
the areas of agriculture, technology, social prosperity, etc. Mindful
of this, it has traditionally sought to demonstrate its greatness through
elaborate displays while working to overcome its deficiencies. Soviet
obsession with the concept of mass serves each of these needs. Physi-
cal greatness impresses the observer and compensates for qualitative
shortcomings, especially in military matters. In World War II, for
example, the mass of the Soviet military effort was the most signifi-
cant determinate of victory. Once mobilized and given momentum, this
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mass literally rolled Westward into Berlin. The contemporary Soviet
order of battle illustrates the continuing influence of this "mass
mentality".
The record clearly indicates a Soviet commitment to achieving stra-
tegic superiority. The magnitude of effort allocated this objective
can only be described as awesome. One comparative measure places the
military buildup in perspective. The Soviet defense effort has grown
at a rate which equaled that of the United States circa 1971, and now
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exceeds it by as much as 25 to 45 percent.
Most disturbing of all, the Soviets have undertaken a long-term
military buildup that still continues after more than 15 years.
What lies behind this buildup is a subject for debate. There can
be no doubt, however, about the fact of the buildup itself... The
seriousness with which the Soviets have undertaken — and give
every sign of continuing — this effort is as impressive as
its magnitude.
It is not surprising that the Soviet Union has embarked on a pro-
gram of this dimension. Failure to have done so would be tantamount to
accepting permanent strategic inferiority — a posture to be avoided at
all costs by any superpower. To expect that the Soviet Union would
be content with anything less than equality, or fail to see the utility
of superiority, would be the height of political naivete. Doubtless
the lessons associated with Berlin, Korea, and Cuba have not gone
unheeded. Likewise, the lessons of Africa and the Middle East are
equally instructive in the benefits of sufficient strategic power. An
interesting subject for speculation concerns the nature of the lessons
to be learned under conditions of Soviet superiority.
Soviet military doctrine calls for superiority of forces, both
tactical and strategic, as a precondition to victory. In this regard,
it is helpful to recall that Soviet doctrine posits superiority of
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forces, especially nuclear, as the first law of warfare. With this in
mind, the growth rate of the nuclear arsenal fits neatly into the over-
all pattern of Soviet strategic thought.
In the West, a strategic superiority is frequently viewed as an
undesirable or unattainable relationship among superpowers. Henry
Kissinger summarized this popular conviction in a celebrated statement
issued in Moscow in July 1974. "What in the name of God is strategic
superiority? What is the significance of it politically, militarily,
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operationally, at these levels of numbers? What do you do with it?"
This thinking is shaped in part by the erosion of the strategic supre-
macy of the United States. During the period in which the U.S. held
a monopoly on nuclear weapons, and later when it controlled a clear
preponderance of strategic power, definite political, military, and
operational significance was attached. Superiority was perceived as
an aid in the control of the Soviet Union. Now that this relationship
has been altered, superiority is condemned as a destabilizing influence.
This line of reasoning appears to advocate a condition when it gives
one advantage, and denounce that same condition when it works to one's
disadvantage. The Soviet Union does not share the view that strategic
superiority is an undesirable, unattainable, or destabilizing condition.
On the contrary, it has been a long sought after objective which is
fast approaching. The Soviet quest for this status is driven by a
historic obsession to escape inferiority, a belief in the political
utility of strategic power, and a military realization that superiority
is essential to survival in the event of war.
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The third and final issue of the grand debate concerns the Soviet
view of nuclear war. On this count, one may credit Soviet military
thought with an amazingly thorough and realistic approach to the prob-
lem of strategy in a nuclear age. The doctrine is self-reliant, ra-
tional, and sound. Capitalizing on key principles of surprise, early
seizure of the strategic initiative, and decisive use of nuclear weapons,
it provides a viable means of securing Soviet objectives in the event
of war. It can also support the avoidance of war by providing an abi-
lity to wage it, and possibly win. In this sense it can deter an oppo-
nent from resort to nuclear contest by virtue of the threat of "losing".
The Soviet approach to "deterrence" (war avoidance) posits a loser-
winner relationship, and must be distinguished from the Western notion
of deterrence which is based on a loser-loser outcome. Where Western
thought concentrates on mutual avoidance cooperation
,
Soviet thinking,
being more self-dependent, focuses on enforced avoidance. Perhaps the
phrase "coercive deterrence" describes the essence of Soviet strategic
doctrine. To paraphrase an old adage: the most secure defense can
best be maintained with a good offensive orientation.
Soviet doctrine embodies a philosophical rejection of mutual deter-
rence through assured destruction. This is not at all surprising when
viewed in the context of the Soviet we 1 1anschauung . Mutual deterrence
equates with mutual cooperation which, in turn, translates into mutual
vulnerability. All are heavily dependent upon mutual trust, which
will inevitably be shaken by mutual fear of opponent intentions.
Georgi Arbatov, Director of the Institute of USA and Canada, summarized
the Soviet aversion to this theoretical concert as follows. "Of
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course one cannot defend the concept of deterrence in itself— this
concept of 'peace founded on fear' which would in all circumstances
be an unstable and bad peace." The Soviet alternative is a concept
of peace founded on strategic power. The accompanying doctrine thus
assumes a war waging—damage limiting—war winning cast.
This offensive militaristic approach to the problem of strategic
warfare frequently alarms the Western observer. In defense, he tends
to dismiss the doctrine as a bluff, or to refute it on grounds that it
is irrational or primitive. Such thinking is perilous. Soviet doc-
trine should be accepted for what it says. When facing an opponent
over an issue as vital as survival, is it not more prudent to take
him at his word, given credible evidence as to his sincerity, than to
chance the future to some speculative hope that his statements lack
commitment?
In the final analysis, the strategic nuclear doctrine of the Soviet
Union is a policy formulated by that segment of society charged with
the responsibility of insuring the security of the state. Hopefully,
one can acknowledge a separation between the political decision maker
and the military strategist. The real danger lies in the possibility
that someday the decision maker might feel the need to turn to his
military counterpart with the request that the doctrine be implemented.
What are the implications of this analysis for U.S. national secu-
rity? First, recognizing that the Soviet Union approaches issues from
a different orientation conditioned by divergent interests and expe-
riences, the U.S. should acknowledge the lack of a concensus on which
a mutual, harmonious, and cooperative marriage of interests can be
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built — at least for the foreseeable future. It should reexamine its
policy in light of the competitive nature of the relationship, bolster
its will, and rise to the challenges issued with a degree of resolve
that will communicate in terms comprehendible to the Soviet Union.
It should avoid any unilateral restraint and accommodation because
this type of behavior is interpreted by the Soviet Union not as an
invitation to cooperation, but as an opportunity which must be exploited.
The SALT process should be encouraged for two reasons. First, it
permits a strategic dialogue which aids in the relaxation of tension,
and promotes common understanding. Second, it offers a prospect for
moderating the growth of strategic forces if substantive and equitable
agreements can be reached. SALT is not a panacea. It is instead a
means with which only the symptoms of a complex problem can be treated.
When the spirit of the limitation process is violated, it is incumbent
upon the other partner to quicken the pace so as not to yield stra-
tegic advantage. Meaningful limitations can be achieved only when
both parties recognize the futility of acquiring the upper hand. Un-
fortunately, the history of SALT does not teach this lesson. The Soviet
Union has exercised all conceivable options under the guise of SALT in
overt pursuit of strategic advantage. Failure of the U.S. to implement
programs which deny Soviet ascendency merely reinforces Moscow's quest
for superiority. The contents of SALT II do not appear to remedy this
situation.
One disquieting feature of the SALT II treaty is the growth poten-
tial it allows the Soviet arsenal. Despite the apparent "cap" of 2250
strategic delivery systems (2400 through 1981), the agreement allows
for almost exponential growth of Soviet warheads, significant increases
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in megatonnage, and further refinements in technological quality. There
is little doubt that the Soviet Union will continue its pattern of buil-
ding its forces at least to the limits of the treaty. The prospect that
the United States will do likewise, if challenged, is not as certain,
whether for lack of will or of funds. This could lead to a situation
in the 1980 's in which the Soviet Union holds undisputed strategic
superiority.
Finally, the U.S. should reexamine its strategic doctrine with the
objective of further reducing emphasis on the concept of "mutual deter-
rence" as a key doctrinal principle. While such an approach may have
offered a degree of security in the 1950 's and 1960* s, its utility in
an era characterized by increasing Soviet war waging and damage limi-
ting capabilities is diminished. The U.S. would be wise to take heed
of the Soviet observation that the prospect of nuclear war has two
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